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OHIO'S STATUTORY AND COMMON LAW HISTORY
WITH "TERRORISM": A STUDY IN DOMESTIC
TERRORISM LAW
Nathaniel Stewart*

"Any government which cannot
protect its people from violence and terrorism is a
1
government in name only."

I. INTRODUCTION

In 2004, Ohio district attorneys sat uniquely poised to prosecute two high-profile
murder cases under the state's new anti-terrorism legislation. Both cases had garnered
national attention and potentially provided an opportunity for lawmakers, judges,
prosecutors, and defense counselors nationwide to witness a rare and virtually
simultaneous application of domestic terrorism law in two unrelated crimes. Cuyahoga
County prosecutors were the first to file terrorism charges under Ohio's new law,
indicting Biswanath Halder for his deadly rampage through Case Western Reserve
University's Peter B. Lewis Building on May 9, 2003. 2 Halder surrendered to
Cleveland police after firing hundreds of rounds in a seven-hour "cat-and-mouse"
standoff through the building's serpentine halls. 3 His 338-count indictment included
murder, attempted murder, kidnapping, and4terrorism and offered Ohio prosecutors their
first run at a domestic terrorism conviction.
*Fellow, the Institute for Global Security Law and Policy, Case Western Reserve School of Law. J.D., Case
Western Reserve School of Law; M.A., John Carroll University; B.A., Hillsdale College. Thanks to Jonathan
H. Adler, Jennifer R. Gowens, Rafael A. Madan, Kevin C. McMunigal, Andrew P. Morriss, and Paul S. Teller
for their comments and patient editorial assistance. The author is especially grateful for the research and
inspiration of Tasia McIntyr on which portions of this article rely and build.
1. Ohio v. Kassay, 184 N.E. 521, 525 (Ohio 1932).
2. See Harlan Spector, CWRU Gunman Used a "Poor Man's Uzi" "Junk" Weapon May Have Cut
Death Toll, THE PLAIN DEALER (Cleveland), May 15, 2003, at Al.
3. See Mike Tobin, Search and Survival at CWRU." How SWAT Team Got Gunman, THE PLAIN
DEALER (Cleveland), May 14, 2003, at Al.
4. See Scott Hiaasen, Death Penalty Sought in CWRU Siege, THE PLAIN DEALER (Cleveland), May 30,
2003, at Al.
Halder, 62, faces a range of charges, including aggravated murder, kidnapping-282 counts, two
for every hostage-and even terrorism. The indictment includes 36 counts of attempted murderone count, Prosecutor Bill Mason said, for each bullet Halder is accused of firing at 24 police
officers and six civilians during the seven-hour standoff inside the building's undulating walls.
Halder is subject to the death penalty under several legal theories, Mason said, including the state's
terrorism law, enacted in May 2002 in response to the Sept. 11,2001, terrorist attacks.
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But within several months, Ohio had a second potential "terrorist" on its hands.
From October 2003 until he was apprehended in March 2004, Charles McCoy waged a
"terrorizing" sniper attack on 1-270 in Franklin County, shooting randomly at motorists
and killing a woman. 5 His five-month shooting spree along the Columbus-area
highway eerily echoed the attacks staged by the Washington, D.C. "Beltway Snipers,"
John Allen Muhammed and John Lee Malvo, in 2002. 6 As one news report explained,
in response to McCoy's attacks "[s]chools canceled recess, parents kept their children
indoors, people changed their routes to work, and central Ohio became national news as
the shootings continued ..... 7 Despite the terrifying effect of his assault, when county
prosecutors finally brought charges against McCoy, terrorism was not on their list.
Instead, McCoy faced "charges of aggravated murder, murder, felonious assault,
vandalism and improper discharge of a firearm."' 8 Ultimately, after his death-penalty
proceedings ended in a mistrial, McCoy pleaded guilty to involuntary manslaughter and
9
ten other related charges and was sentenced to twenty-seven years in prison.
These cases present what may seem to be an odd, legal twist. After all, McCoy,
whose crimes were strikingly similar to other acts of domestic terrorism in both nature
and effect, was not prosecuted for terrorism under the state's new law. 10 Halder, on the
other hand, whose crimes though deadly and tragic, arguably resembled a man "going
postal" 11 more than a hardened terrorist, was charged with terrorism. Why? The
The law toughens penalties for criminals who "intimidate or coerce a civilian population." Halder
is the first person in Ohio charged under this law, Mason said.
Id.; see also Jim Nichols, Shooting Defendant Ruled Competent: Man to be Tried for Case Incident, THE
PLAIN DEALER (Cleveland), Apr. 20, 2005, at B I.
5. See Bruce Cadwallader, McCoy Tearfully Takes Blame; Victim's Family, FriendsAren't Forgivingas
Shooter Begins 27-year Prison Term, COLUMBUS DISPATCH, Aug. 10, 2005, at 1A ("The central Ohio shooter
who terrorized motorists for months sobbed in court yesterday as he apologized for killing a woman and for
instilling fear in local drivers.").
6. See Josh White & Tom Jackman, Sentences Not End of Sniper Cases; No Consensus on 2nd Trials,
WASH. POST, Mar. 7, 2004, at C01 (reporting that John Allen Muhammad and Lee Boyd Malvo, were
"charged with 10 slayings in the Washington region" and "sentenced in separate Virginia courtrooms for
committing terrorism and murder").
7. Bruce Cadwallader, Selection of Jury Begins in Sniper Case, COLUMBUS DISPATCH, Apr. 8, 2005, at
01B.
8. Id.
9. See Ohio Sniper Receives 27 Year Sentence, USA TODAY, Aug. 8, 2005, available at http://www.
usatoday.com/news/nation/2005-08-08-highway-shootings~x.htm?csp=34.
10. See Carol Morello & Jamie Stockwell, No Attacks, No Arrests, No Shortage Of Anxiety; Area Faces
New Week Under the Sniper's Gun, WASH. POST, Oct. 14, 2002, at A01 (discussing the Beltway Sniper
killings); see also Peter Whoriskey, Home Depot Slaying Defies All Theories; Shooting Spreads Fear to
Fairfax,WASH. POST, Oct. 16, 2002, at B01.
1I. Wikipedia has defined the phrase as follows:
Going postal is an American English slang term, used as a verb meaning to commit murder,
mass murder or a killing spree in the workplace, generally by a current or former employee. The
term derives from a series of incidents from 1986 onwards in which United States Postal Service
(USPS) workers shot and killed managers, fellow workers, and members of the police or general
public.
On August 20, 1986, 14 employees were killed at the Edmond, Oklahoma, Post Office by
postman Patrick Sherrill, who then committed suicide, bringing the total to 15 dead. Between 1986
and 1997, more than 40 people were killed in more than 20 incidents.
Following this series of events, the idiom has entered into common usage, and is applied to
murders committed by employees in the workplace, irrespective of the employer; and occasionally
more loosely to describe killings in the workplace other than by employees in situations in which
the motive is not commonplace.
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answer is not straightforward and likely involves any number of variables in a legal
calculus that includes the crimes' evidence, legal strategies, the prosecutors and their
individual and political discretion, as well as the respective defendants and their
motives. But a common denominator in both cases, of course, was Ohio's antiterrorism statute. The state conceivably could have held two domestic terrorism trials
simultaneously. It didn't; that is the important point.
Indeed, as this article was going to press, Cuyahoga County Common Pleas Judge
Peggy Foley Jones dismissed the terrorism charge against Biswanath Halder. At the
conclusion of the evidence, Judge Jones ruled that "the attack against a 'small, random'
group of people in the business school building did not constitute a terrorist attack as
defined by Ohio law."' 12 The jury subsequently convicted Halder of all 196 charges
remaining against him at trial.13 Thus, although the state has prosecuted its first case
under the new law, Ohio has yet to convict its first "terrorist."
But rather than attempt to distinguish Biswanath Halder and Charles McCoy, or to
explain why Halder stood trial for terrorism while McCoy was not even charged, this
article highlights these cases to demonstrate the ambiguities of state terrorism law and
the inherent difficulty in defining domestic terrorism. That the Halder and McCoy
cases could play out as they have suggests that Ohio's anti-terrorism statute is open to
interpretation. Too open, some might say. As such, the statute will undoubtedly be
applied (or not applied) variously by county prosecutors and district attorneys across the
state and may require extensive court and jury interpretation-though as Judge Jones'
ruling suggests, perhaps not too extensive. This article offers an "interpretive tool" and
historical context for courts and theorists to employ in those efforts and in assessing any
future crimes of terrorism.
Section II briefly sketches the on-going and especially difficult task of defining
"terrorism." Section III examines Ohio's current anti-terrorism statute, focusing on the
prosecution's burden and the components of the newly defined crime. Section IV then
looks to Ohio's earlier statutory and common law treatment of "terrorism," with Section
V noting some of the state's other uses of both "terrorism" and "terror." Section VI
concludes. It is worth emphasizing upfront that the article does not offer its own
definition of terrorism, nor does it advocate adopting any one particular or set of
definitions. Rather, it denotes some of the similarities and subtle differences between
the state's current statutory scheme and its former statutory and common law
understandings of "terror" in order to provide a historical context through which to
interpret Ohio's most recent anti-terrorism provisions. Looking at how earlier state
legislatures, courts, and juries used and understood these interrelated words may
illuminate their current meaning and advance future legislative efforts to address our
evolving notions of terrorism.
The significance of this approach transcends Ohio law. Any state prosecuting
terrorism or struggling to interpret the latent ambiguities within its own terrorism laws

Wikipedia, Going Postal, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Going-postal (last visited Nov. 11, 2005).
12. Thomas Sheeran, Judge: Case Western Rampage Not Terrorism, Dec. 14, 2005, at AO1.
13. See James F. McCarty, Case Gunman Guilty, THE PLAIN DEALER (Cleveland), Dec. 17, 2005, at Al;
Jim Nichols, Halder'sDefense Tries to Avoid Death Penalty, THE PLAIN DEALER (Cleveland), Dec. 15, 2005,
at BI.
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should find it useful to explore its earlier statutory uses, judicial interpretations, and
common law understandings. As will hopefully become clear, these histories are likely
to reveal a slow evolution of "terror" and "terrorism" and the meanings legislatures,
judges, and juries ascribed to them. Those meanings, while not dispositive for our
contemporary understanding, may help to explain or give context to the most recent
legislative initiatives. Ohio is one of dozens of states with its own anti-terrorism
statutes enacted after September 11.14 Its language models other federal and state
terrorism laws and is not peculiar to Ohio. As such, this article takes up Ohio's law as a
viable case study for the application and interpretation of the nation's domestic
terrorism law. Thus, lessons gleaned from this interpretive method, namely, studying
prior statutory and common law history with "terrorism," can be readily and similarly
applied in almost any other state in the Union.
II. THE PROBLEM OF THE PROBLEM OF DEFINITIONS

15

Scholars and lawmakers have long-struggled to find a workable definition of
terrorism, some going so far as to compare the search for a single definition to the
mythical quest for the Holy Grail. 16 The desire and attempts to define terrorism,
particularly in the post-September 11 era, combined with the sheer difficulty in arriving
at an acceptable description, have created an almost overwhelming amount of literature

14. E.g., Alabama (Anti-Terrorism Act of 2002, Ala. Code §§ 13A-10-150 to 154 (1994 & Supp.
2004)); Alaska (Alaska Stat. § 11.31.120(h) (2004), adding terroristic threatening and criminal mischief to
serious felony charges); Arizona (Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. §§ 13-2301, 13-2308.01 (Supp. 2004), defining and
criminalizing terrorism); Connecticut (Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 5 3a-300 (West Supp. 2005), defining and
criminalizing terrorism); Delaware (Del. Code Ann. tit. 11, § 621 (2001), defining and criminalizing
terroristic threatening); District of Columbia (D.C. Code Ann. §§ 22-3152 to 3153 (LexisNexis Supp. 2005),
defining and criminalizing terrorism); Florida (Fla. Stat. Ann. §§ 775.30-31 (West 2005), defining and
criminalizing terrorism); Georgia (Ga. Code Ann. § 16-4-10 (2003), defining and criminalizing domestic
terrorism); Idaho (Idaho Code Ann. §§ 18-8102(5), 18-8103 (2004), defining and criminalizing acts of
terrorism); Indiana (Ind. Code Ann. §§ 35-41-1-26.5, 35-47-12-1 (West 2004), defining and criminalizing
terrorism); Iowa (Iowa Code Ann. § 708A.I-A.6 (West 2003), defining and criminalizing terrorism);
Louisiana (La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 14:128.1 (2004), defining and criminalizing terrorism); Maine (Me. Rev.
Stat. Ann. tit. 5, § 3360(3)(F) (2002), adopting the federal definition of terrorism as defined by 18 U.S.C. §
2331); Michigan (Michigan Anti-Terrorism Act, Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. § 750.543a-.543f (West 2004),
defining and criminalizing terrorism); Minnesota (Minn. Stat. Ann. §609.713, 714 (West 2003 & Supp. 2005),
defining terrorist threats and crimes in furtherance of terrorism); New Jersey (September 11th, 2001 AntiTerrorism Act, N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2C:38-1 to :38-5 (West 2005), defining and criminalizing terrorism);
Oklahoma (Oklahoma Antiterrorism Act, Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 21, §1268 (West 2002), defining and
criminalizing terrorism); Pennsylvania (18 Pa. Stat. Ann. § 11.103 (West Supp. 2005), defining and
criminalizing terrorism); South Carolina (S.C. Code Ann. §16-23-710(18), 715, 720 (Supp. 2004), defining
and criminalizing terrorism); South Dakota (S.D. Codified Laws § 22-8-12 (2004 & Supp. 2005), defining and
criminalizing terrorism); Tennessee (Terrorism Prevention and Response Act of 2002, Tenn. Code Ann. §§
39-13-801 to 808 (2003), defining and criminalizing terrorism); Utah (Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-107 (2003),
defining and criminalizing terroristic threats); Virginia (Va. Code Ann. §§ 18.2-46.4 to 46.10 (2004), defining
and criminalizing act of terrorism); West Virginia (W. Va. Code Ann. § 61-6-24 (LexisNexis 2005), defining
and criminalizing terrorist acts); and Wyoming (Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-40-102(a)(iii) (2005), adopting the
federal definition of terrorism as defined by 18 U.S.C. 2331).
15. See H.H.A. Cooper, Terrorism: The Problem of the Problem of Definition, 26 CHITrY'S L.J. 105
(1978).
16. James A. R. Nafziger, The Grave New World of Terrorism: A Lawyer's View, 31 DENV. J. INT'L L. &
POL'Y 1, 10 (2002) ("[A]n operational definition [of terrorism] remains the Holy Grail of the terrorism
debate.").
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on the subject. 17 Some, like R.R. Baxter, have responded by suggesting that the quest
be abandoned entirely. 18 Other theorists, recognizing the inherent complexity and
controversy in the term, have advocated using simple definitions as concise, for
instance, as Brian Jenkins', "the use or threatened use of force designed to bring about
political change,"' 19 and Walter Lacqueur's, "the illegitimate use of force to achieve a
political objective by targeting innocent people." 20 Others have objected, however, that
"simplicity does not solve the problem" because "there is no meaningful way to apply a
do so invariably "leave
simple definition to specific acts of terrorism," and attempts 2to
1
frustrated."
scientists
social
and
academicians, policymakers,
The political and legal natures of the term and surrounding debate understandably
have led many politicians, legislators, and scholars to focus on legal definitions of
terrorism that "give governments specific crimes that can be used to take action against
terrorist activities." 22 As Nicholas J. Perry recently documented, federal law alone now
contains "at least nineteen definitions or descriptions of terrorism, as well as three terms
relating to the support of terrorism."' 23 But legal definitions often ignore the social and
political nature of terrorism 24 and are likely to "contain internal contradictions" so that
"some groups can be labeled as terrorists, while other groups engaged in the same
' 25
activities may be described as legitimate revolutionaries." 26 Thus, as many have
fighter.
observed, one man's terrorist is another man's freedom
17. OMAR MALIK, ENOUGH OF THE DEFINITION OF TERRORISM xvii (2001); see also Michael P. Scharf,

Defining Terrorism as the Peace Time Equivalent of War Crimes: A Case of Too Much Convergence Between
InternationalHumanitarian Law and InternationalCriminal Law?, 7 ILSA J. INT'L & CoMP. L. 391, 391
(2001) ("The problem of defining 'terrorism' has vexed the international community for years."); Nicholas J.
Perry, The Numerous FederalLegal Definitions of Terrorism: The Problem of Too Many Grails,30 J. LEGIS.
The difficulties in
249, 252 (2004) ("The scholarly literature on terrorism is 'vast and ever expanding' ....
defining terrorism caused by the changing nature of the term apply not only to the past but also to the future,
since no definition can cover all of what a prospective terrorist might do.").
18. R.R. Baxter, A Skeptical Look at the Concept of Terrorism, 7 AKRON L. REV. 380, 380 (1973) ("The
term is imprecise, it is ambiguous; and above all, it serves no operative legal purpose.").
19. JONATHAN R. WHITE, TERRORISM 8 (3d ed. 2002) (referring to the definition proposed by Brian
Jenkins in 1984).
20. Id. (referring to a definition offered by Walter Laqueur in 1987).
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. Perry, supra note 17, at 255.
24. WHITE, supra note 19, at 8.

25. Id. See also Susan Tiefenbrun, A Semiotic Approach to a Legal Definition of Terrorism, 9 ILSA J.
INT'L & COMP. L. 357, 358-59 (2003):

Terrorism must be deconstructed to distinguish between domestic and international terrorism,
state-sponsored and non-state sponsored terrorism, and terrorism per se and legal revolutionary
violence that falls within the laws of war. Semiotics is the science of signs. A semiotic
approach to the meaning of the term "terrorism" includes an investigation of its hidden
meanings, its connotations as well as denotations, in order to expose the deep structure of the
term and to unravel its complexities. A semiotic approach is designed to uncover the basic
structural elements of the meaning of a term, and each element acts as a sign for the
identification of a terrorist act. The elements of the definition are either necessary or sufficient
for the act to be deemed a terrorist act.
Id.
26. As Richard E. Rubenstein explains: "Clearly, no such definition will tell us whether the kidnappers
of Israeli athletes at the 1972 Munich Olympics were 'terrorist criminals' or 'heroic freedom fighters,' or
which terms best describe [the] Nicaraguan Contras." RICHARD E. RUBENSTEIN, ALCHEMISTS OF
REVOLUTION: TERRORISM INTHE MODERN WORLD 19 (1987); see also Cooper, supra note 15, at 106-7.
The term "'terrorism" is a judgmental one in that it not only encompasses some event produced
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Other nuanced attempts, like those offered by Martha Crenshaw, have analyzed
terrorism's "act, target, and possibility of success" so as not to confuse terrorism with
revolutionary violence. 27 In her view, "terrorism means socially and politically
' 28
unacceptable violence aimed at an innocent target to achieve a psychological effect."
29
Still others, like Michael Walzer, require a "random-act" component for terrorism,
while some have focused on state-sponsored terrorism and the political and economic
sources of the terrorist activities, and others have framed terrorism as a form of state
repression. 3 Then, of course, there are the religiously zealous terrorists, 31 ecological
terrorists, 32 cyberterrorists, 33 narcoterrorists, 34 and even so-called corporate
terrorists.35 In short, "terrorism" has proven an elusive, multifaceted term with any
number of applications and for which no unified theory or controlling definition seems
acceptable or even appropriate. 36 However, its many competing and overlapping
by human behavior but seeks to assign a value or quality to that behavior .... The problem of
the definition of terrorism is more than semantic. It is really a cloak for a complexity of
problems, psychological, political, legalistic, and practical.
Cooper,supra note 15, at 106-7.
27. WHITE, supra note 19, at 9 (referring to Crenshaw's definition offered in 1983).
28. Id.
29. MICHAEL WALZER, ARGUING ABOUT WAR 130 (2004) ("[Terrorism] is the deliberate killing of
innocent people, at random, in order to spread fear through a whole population and force the hand of its
political leaders."). The seemingly random nature of terrorist killing, as suggested by Walzer, was poetically
captured in Nobel Poet Laureate Wislawa Szymborska's verse, "The Terrorist, He's Watching," the opening
lines of which read:
The bomb in the bar will explode at thirteen twenty.
Now it's just thirteen sixteen.
There's still time for some to go in,
and some to come out.
WISLAWA SZYMBORSKA, VIEW WITH A GRAIN OF SAND 108 (1995).
30. See WHITE, supra note 19, at 9 (discussing definitions focused on terrorist states and terroristic
governments); see also WENDELL BERRY, CITIZENSHIP PAPERS 3 (2003) (suggesting that "[a] more correct
definition of 'terrorism' would be this: violence perpetrated unexpectedly without the authorization of a
national government").
31. See generally JESSICA STERN, TERROR IN THE NAME OF GOD: WHY RELIGIOUS MILITANTS KILL
(2003); DANIEL BENJAMIN & STEVEN SIMON, THE AGE OF SACRED TERROR (2002); MARK JUERGENSMEYER,
TERROR IN THE MIND OF GOD: THE GLOBAL RISE OF RELIGIOUS VIOLENCE (2001); AMIR TAHIRi, HOLY
TERROR (1987).
32. Referring to those who commit destructive acts in order to save the environment. See WHITE, supra
note 19, at 7 (counting ecological terrorists among those who "become so consumed with a particular cause
that they create a surrogate religion and take violent action to advance their beliefs").
33. See id. (referring to "computer attacks, viruses, or destruction of an information infrastructure").
34. Id. (noting that "drug organizations frequently use terrorist tactics, and some terrorist organizations
sell drugs to support their political activities" and referring to these groups as "narcoterrorists").
35. See DAN RAVIV, COMIC WARS: How Two TYCOONS BATTLED OVER THE MARVEL COMICS
EMPIRE-AND BOTH LOST (2002).
36. For a discussion of the current and historical difficulty within the United Nations General Assembly
in reaching international agreement on defining terrorism, see Gerhard Hafner, Certain Issues of the Work of
the Sixth Committee at the Fifty-sixth GeneralAssembly, 97 AM. J. INT'L L. 147, 156-58 (2003).
The problem of defining terrorism, which has long bothered the General Assembly, arose
during the negotiation of conventions dealing with various special forms of terrorism, such as
the 1988 Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Maritime
Navigation. None of these global conventions contain a satisfactory generic definition; only
the 1999 International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism includes a
definition in its Article 2(l)(b) that goes beyond the definitions of special conduct found in
other conventions. •
The difficulty of reaching an agreement on a generally acceptable definition reflects the
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definitions do suggest that the term itself may be used to describe a continuum of
aggressive behavior ranging from isolated criminal activity to highly trained state37
sponsored militias moving in concert toward a political or ideological objective.
Thus, long before America's current "War on Terror" and the tragic events of
September 11, 2001 that inspired it, scholars recognized that "there is no satisfactory
political definition of terror extant or forthcoming ... no common academic consensus
as to the essence of terror and no common language with which to shape a model
acceptable to political scientists or social psychologists. ''3 8 Indeed, terrorism has been
described as "a condition known implicitly to most men, but which is somehow beyond
rigorous examination." 39 As a result, writes Richard Rubenstein, terrorism maintains
old saying that one state's "terrorist" is another state's "freedom fighter." The general
acceptability of a definition of terrorism obviously depends on a certain political homogeneity
or at least ideological affinity of the participating countries since those conventions which
include a generic definition are of a regional nature, such as the Organization of the Islamic
Conference's Convention on Combating International Terrorism of 1999, the OAU Convention
on the Prevention and Combating of Terrorism of 1999, the Treaty on Cooperation Among the
States Members of the Commonwealth of Independent States in Combating Terrorism of 1999,
and the Arab Convention on the Suppression of Terrorism of 1998. The difficulty of achieving
uniformity was clearly demonstrated by the fact that, despite the events of September 11, states
were not able to arrive at such a definition in either the Sixth Committee or the working group.
Moreover, the definitions in the various regional conventions illustrate the wide gap between
them: for instance, the OAS Convention refers only to crimes against internationally protected
persons, in contrast to most other relevant conventions, such as the European Convention on
the Suppression of Terrorism; and the Islamic Conference Convention, but not the OAS
Convention, includes intent as an element of the crime in the definition of terrorism. Like the
resolutions relating to terrorism adopted earlier by the General Assembly, the proposal
presented by the chairman of the working group of the Sixth Committee opts for the second
approach by defining the purpose of the activity as a necessary element; namely, the "purpose
of the conduct, by its nature or context, is to intimidate a population, or to compel a
Government or an international organization to do or abstain from doing any act."
Id. (citations omitted).
37. See Tiefenbrun, supra note 25, at 359 (explaining the necessity of "distinguish[ing] between three
different conceptions of terrorism: terrorism as a crime in itself, terrorism as a method to perpetrate other
crimes, and terrorism as an act of war").
38. J. BOWYER BELL, TRANSNATIONAL TERROR 6 (1975). For an analysis of the academic literature and
debate over the term "terrorism," see Perry, supranote 17, at 250-5 1.
The scholarly literature on terrorism is "vast and ever expanding." Although some
scholars ignore the need for a definition of terrorism or resort to Justice Stewart's comment on
obscenity, "I know it when I see it," many others join the definitional quest. As H.H.A. Cooper
observed, "Many conferences and writings on the subject of terrorism begin with the
obligatory, almost ritualistic recitation by the presenter of some preferred definition of
terrorism." These obligatory definitional recitations have resulted in numerous definitions of
terrorism in the scholarship on the topic. A 1983 study by Alex P. Schmid catalogued 109
different definitions of terrorism used between 1936 and 1980, and "more definitions have
appeared since."
The search for a definition of terrorism has been described by Cooper in an earlier article
as "the problem of the problem of definition." The problem continues notwithstanding, or
perhaps in part because of, the numerous scholars seeking a definition. It has been lamented
that further progress has not been made in defining terrorism, "despite the increasingly large
volume of publications addressing terrorism".... The lack of definitional consensus on
terrorism, however, is attributable to more than the nature of scholarship; more fundamentally,
it reflects the nature of the term being defined.
Perry, supra note 17, at 250-51 (citations omitted).
39. BELL, supra note 38, at 6. This quality has provoked countless comparisons in legal literature to
Justice Stewart's observation on obscenity, "I know it when I see it." See, e.g., H.H.A. Cooper, Terrorism:
The Problem of Definitions Revisited, 44 AM. BEHAV. SCIENTIST 881, 892 (2001) ("As with obscenity, we
know terrorism well enough when we see it.").
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"an aura of mystery." 40
In her own attempt to pierce this aural veil, the state of Ohio defined and
criminalized "acts of terror" in the wake of September 11, joining many of her sisters in
an effort to bolster the legal arsenal against terrorism and terrorist threats. 4 1 In doing
so, the state adopted a legal definition that inevitably placed "terror" somewhere on the
continuum of currently modeled definitions, and it did so with more than a modicum of
ambiguity. When faced with an ambiguous statute, the Ohio legislature and the state's
Supreme Court have directed the bench to "first look[] to the language of the statute and
the purpose to be accomplished," 42 and then to consider a series of interpretive tools,
including the legislative history, the circumstances under which the statute was enacted,
43
the common law, and former statutory provisions on similar subjects.
This article aims to provide an "interpretive tool" by way of an abridged catalogue
of Ohio's statutory and common law history with "terror" and "terrorism" in an effort to
help interpret and ultimately apply the state's most recent anti-terrorism statute more
accurately by examining their uses contextually. As one federal court has observed,
"words are like chameleons; they frequently have different shades of meaning
depending upon the circumstances." 44 But beyond the mutable nature of words and the
Ohio Supreme Court's directive to consider such interpretive tools, there is at least a
persuasive, if not compelling, precedent for pursuing a contextual approach like this and
arriving at definitions according to their prior, contemporary and common usage, rather
than through a more theoretical analysis of motives, causes, victims and agendas. A
brief lexicographical history illustrates:
On Guy Fawkes Day, 1857, Doctor Richard Chenevix Trench addressed fellow
members of England's prestigious Philological Society regarding "Some Deficiencies in
Our English Dictionaries." ' 45 To those gathered in London Library he proposed a
monumental lexicographical undertaking above and beyond what even esteemed
lexicographers like the great Samuel Johnson had achieved-a complete "inventory of
the language."' 46 As one biographer has described it, Trench's "new project would
present all of it: every word, every nuance, every shading of meaning and spelling and
pronunciation, every twist of etymology, every possible illustrative citation from every
English author." 47 This "new project" traced the language's history and usage of words
through a unique and "rigorous dependence on gathering quotations from published or
otherwise recorded uses of English and using them to illustrate the use of the sense of
every single word in the language"48-a rigor that would require "the reading of
everything and the quoting of everything that showed anything of the history of the

40. RUBENSTEIN, supra note 26, at 20.
41. See OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2909.21-25 (LexisNexis 2004).
42. Christe v. GMS Mgmt. Co., 726 N.E.2d 497, 498 (Ohio 2000); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1.49
(LexisNexis 2004).
43. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1.49 (LexisNexis 2004).

44. United States v. Romain, 393 F.3d 63, 74 (1st Cir. 2004).
45. SIMON WINCHESTER, THE PROFESSOR AND THE MADMAN: A TALE OF MURDER, INSANITY, AND THE
MAKING OF THE OxFoRD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 103, 104 (1998).

46. Id.
47. Id.
48. Id. at 25.
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words that were to be cited." 49 This, of course, presented an impossible task, beyond
the skills of any devoted staff of researchers. But to the learned Philological Society,
Trench countered with a revolutionary idea: lexicographic volunteers. Over the next
seventy years, the dictionary's editorial staff solicited and collected contributions from
thousands of unpaid amateur researchers and philologists providing the editors with
literature. 50
documented uses of words found in every conceivable corner of English
From these amateur contributions, the research staff compiled and catalogued the
history, usage, and meaning of every word in the English language. Upon publication
in 1928, comprising twelve large volumes and defining over five hundred thousand
words, 5 1 the once affectionately dubbed "big dictionary" received its proper title-the
Oxford English Dictionary.5 2

This article serves as a "volunteer's" limited contribution to the veritable dictionary
of definitions currently being offered by politicians, scholars, lawyers and journalists in
the grail-like quests to define and prosecute "terrorism." 53 Rather than add yet another
meaning of the word, the following discussion focuses on one aspect of one state's legal
usage of "terrorism," providing an archival reading of one corner of the law and its
legal literature. It attempts, in the spirit of Richard Trench, a thorough, albeit less-thanexhaustive, inventory of the statutory and common law context surrounding the state's
definition, tracing Ohio's legal etymology of the word.
III. OHIO'S CODIFIED "TERRORISM"
In the immediate aftermath of the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks, the nation's
legislatures took up the challenge of defining and outlawing "terrorism" in their
respective criminal codes. Not surprisingly, New York was one of the first states to
craft anti-terrorism legislation, 54 followed by the federal government's counterterrorism provisions in The Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing
Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism, more commonly

49. Id. at106.
50. The volunteer contribution proceeded as follows:
The volunteers' duties were simple enough, if onerous. They would write to the society offering
their services in reading certain books; they would be asked to read and make word-lists of all that
they read, and would then be asked to look, super-specifically, for certain words that currently
interested the dictionary team. Each volunteer would take a slip of paper, write at its top left-hand
side the target word, and below, also on the left, the date of the details that followed: ... the title
of the book or paper, its volume and page number, and then, below that, the full sentence that
illustrated the use of the target word.
WINCHESTER, supra note 45, at 108. Ultimately, the dictionary staff received over six million such slips of
paper. Id. at 109.
51. Id. at 25.
52. Id. at 103. For a more thorough history of the OED's creation, see Simon Winchester's sequel, THE
MEANING OF EVERYTHING: THE STORY OF THE OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY (2003).
53. As far back as 1983, terrorism analyst Alex Schmid documented at least 109 definitions of terrorism
and concluded that there cannot be one correct or true definition of terrorism. ALEX SCHMID & ALBERT J.
JONGMAN, POLITICAL TERRORISM 5 (1984).
54. New York passed N.Y. PENAL LAW § 490.05 (Consol. Supp. 2005) less than one week after
September 11, 2001. New York's anti-terrorism statute criminalizes the "Crime of Terrorism," defined as one
of a number of specified acts committed "with the intent to intimidate or coerce a civilian population,
influence the policy of a unit of government by intimidation or coercion, or affect the conduct of a unit of
government by murder, assassination or kidnapping .. " N.Y. PENAL LAW § 490.25.
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known as the USA PATRIOT Act, 55 which was followed in turn by similarly inspired
state laws. 56 Since September 11, at least thirty-three states and the District of
Columbia have amended their criminal codes with their own anti-terrorism language,
some explicitly defining terrorism and establishing penalties and punishments for
engaging in "terroristic threats" and "acts of terrorism." 57 Ohio is one of those states.
58
Within months of the al-Qaeda assault, Ohio patterned its anti-terrorism statute
after New York's foray into criminal terrorism law. 59 Ohio's law provides in part:
(A) "Act of terrorism" means an act that is committed within or outside the territorial
jurisdiction of this state or the United States, that constitutes a specified offense if
committed in this state or constitutes an offense in any jurisdiction within or outside
the territorial jurisdiction of the United States containing all of the essential elements
of a specified offense, and that is intended to do one or more of the following:
(1) Intimidate or coerce a civilian population;
(2) Influence the policy of any government by intimidation or coercion;
(3) Affect the conduct of any government by the act that constitutes the
offense. 60

Having so defined an "act of terrorism," the Ohio Code then criminalizes
"terrorism," stating:
(A) No person shall commit a specified offense with purpose to do any of the
following:
(1) Intimidate or coerce a civilian population;
(2) Influence the policy of any government by intimidation or coercion;

55. Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272 (2001). The USA PATRIOT Act defines "domestic terrorism" as
activities occurring "primarily within the territorial jurisdiction of the United States" that "(A) involve acts
dangerous to human life that are a violation of the criminal laws of the United States or of any State" and "(B)
appear to be intended: (i) to intimidate or coerce a civilian population; (ii) to influence the policy of a
government by intimidation or coercion; or (iii) to affect the conduct of a government by mass destruction,
assassination or kidnapping." Id. The federal government entertains other definitions of terrorism as well.
The State Department, for example, has defined terrorism as "premeditated, politically motivated violence
perpetrated against noncombatant targets by subnational groups or clandestine agents, usually intended to
influence an audience." 22 U.S.C. § 2656f(d). The Department of Defense defines terrorism as "the unlawful
use of ...or threatened use of ...force or violence against individuals or property to coerce or intimidate
governments or societies, often to achieve political, religious, or ideological objectives." Department of
Defense, Joint Chiefs of Staff, Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, Joint Publication 1-02, April 12,
2001. The Code of Federal Regulations condemns terrorism as "the unlawful use of force and violence
against persons or property to intimidate or coerce a government, the civilian population, or any segment
thereof, in furtherance of political or social objectives." 28 C.F.R. § 0.85 (2005).
56. For example, see New Jersey's anti-terrorism law. September 11,2001 Anti-Terrorism Act, N.J.
STAT. ANN. § 2C:38-1 (West 2005) (defining and criminalizing terrorism).
57. See statutes cited-supra note 14.
58. OHIO REV.CODE ANN. §2909.21-25 (LexisNexis 2004).

59. See statute cited supra note 54.
60. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2909.21 (LexisNexis 2004).
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(3) Affect the conduct of any government by the specified offense.

(B) (1) Whoever violates this section is guilty of terrorism.
(2) Except as otherwise provided in divisions (B)(3) and (4) of this section,
terrorism is an offense one degree higher61than the most serious underlying
specified offense the defendant committed.
In both sections 2909.21 and 2909.24, the "specified offenses" underlying the "acts
of terrorism" have been defined as meaning any of the following:
(E) (1) A felony offense of violence, a violation of section 2909.04 or 2927.24 of the
Revised Code, or a felony of the first degree that is not a violation of any provision in
Chapter 2925 or 3719 of the Revised Code;
or a conspiracy to commit
(2) An attempt to commit, complicity in committing,
62
section.
this
of
(E)(1)
division
in
listed
an offense
In addition to "felony offense[s] of violence," the enumerated sections of the Ohio
Code, sections 2909.04 and 2927.24, respectively concern disrupting public services
such as television, radio, telephone, mass communication, transportation, law
63
for
and contaminating substances
enforcement, firefighting, computer systems,
64
or radioactive material.
biological,
chemical,
human consumption with hazardous
Ohio's statutory scheme effectively turns certain already criminal activity, or
"specified offenses" into "acts of terrorism" by adding a "purpose" element to the
underlying offense. Thus, there are three components to "terrorism" under Ohio law.
In broad terms, a defendant must (1) commit one of the specified criminal offenses and
(2) do so with the purpose to intimidate, coerce, influence or affect (3) either a civilian
65
At trial, the prosecution must show
population, or governmental policy or conduct.
not only that the defendant committed criminal acts of violence, for example, but also
that the defendant intended those acts to influence or coerce the policies of a
66
government or the people at-large.

61. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2909.24 (LexisNexis 2004).
62. Id. § 2909.21(E).
63. Id. § 2909.04.
64. Id. § 2927.24.
65. See id. § 2909.24.
66. The penalty for committing acts of terrorism is a sentence enhancement based upon the underlying
offense. The statute provides as follows:
(B)(2) . . . terrorism is an offense one degree higher than the most serious underlying specified
offense the defendant committed.
(3) If the most serious underlying specified offense the defendant committed is a felony of the first
degree or murder, the person shall be sentenced to life imprisonment without parole.
(4) If the most serious underlying specified offense the defendant committed is aggravated murder,
the offender shall be sentenced to life imprisonment without parole or death pursuant to sections
2929.02 to 2929.06 of the Revised Code.
Id. § 2909.24.

Journalof Legislation

[Vol. 32:1

Ohio's statute is arguably simultaneously limited and expansive. In at least one
respect, the statute's language is broad, vague, and undefined, thereby granting vast
prosecutorial discretion. It is not clear, for example, what prosecutors must show to
demonstrate that the defendant intended to "intimidate or coerce a civilian
population." 6 7 The term "civilian population" remains conspicuously undefined
anywhere in the Ohio Code, and it might be argued that certain criminal activity by its
very nature has the effect of "intimidating" whole city blocks, neighborhoods, towns,
even counties. Consider, for instance, serial rapists and murderers who intend for their
intimidating and coercive violence to influence not only their immediate victims, but
others in the surrounding area as they taunt law enforcement with letters or
68
communication released to the local media threatening to strike again until caught.
Under Ohio law, these felons might meet the statutory definition of a "terrorist,"
someone intending to commit crimes in order to intimidate the general public.
Accordingly, the statute is quite broad, affording prosecutors wide latitude 69 in bringing
"terrorism" charges against defendants whose crimes have affected communities atlarge.

70

On the other hand, "purpose" or "intent" is generally regarded as perhaps the most
difficult mental state for the prosecution to prove. Ohio courts have understood and
defined "purpose" as
a decision of the mind to do an act with a conscious objective of producing a specific
result or engaging in a specific conduct. To do and act purposely is to do it
intentionally.

The purpose with which any person does any act is known only to

67. Id. § 2909.24(A)(1).
68. The recently apprehended serial killers, the Green River Killer and BTK, who arguably "terrorized"
the Seattle and Wichita regions respectively, illustrate this point. Both killers patiently and methodically
killed their victims over a period of decades, eluding police and threatening to strike again. In the case of
Gary Ridgway, the so-called Green River Killer, court documents describe the slaying of forty-eight young
women, mostly prostitutes. In his guilty plea, Ridgway explained his "common scheme or plan" to "kill as
many women I thought were prostitutes as I possibly could." Newsday.com, Text of Green River Killer's
Confession, http://www.newsday.com/news/nationworld/wire/sns-ap-green-river-confession,0, 1151481 .story?
coll=sns-ap-nationworld-headlines (last visited Nov. 5, 2003). Beginning in 1982, the Green River Killer
carried out this plan, murdering dozens and, it could be argued, terrorizing a kind of "civilian population,"
namely, women and prostitutes in the King County area. Similarly, Dennis Rader, also known as the "BTK"
,strangler, murdered victims and eluded police in the Wichita area for over 25 years. The mere possibility that
the killer could strike again haunted Wichita residents, particularly women, and the families of his victims.
Moreover, Rader sent letters to the news media and law enforcement describing his killing spree, demanding
notoriety, and threatening to kill again. See Cathy Henkel, Killer's Letter Still Haunting 30 Years Later,
SEATTLE TIMEs, Feb. 27, 2005, at Al. Whether Ridgway and Rader should be condemned as "terrorists" as
well as serial killers is debatable, but that they incited and intended "terror" in specific regions and
intimidated "civilian populations" as provided for in the Ohio statute seems clear.
69. See Tasia Mclntyr, Note, ProtectingAgainst Terrorism or Symbolic Politics: FatalFlaws in Ohio's
Criminal Terrorism Statute, 56 CASE W. RES. L. REV. (forthcoming, 2005).
The [Ohio] statute does not provide any definitional clarity or enforcement standards as to what
constitutes a "civilian population." A man of ordinary intelligence will have to guess at the
statute's meaning as it is ambiguous and fails to give fair and adequate warning of the conduct
proscribed. A defendant is unable to gauge his conduct against an established standard, and,
therefore, is not effectively on notice of what conduct is criminalized.
Id.
70. Of course, the Ohio statute does not require that the criminal activity successfully influence or coerce
the government or civilian population. Only intent is required, and the prosecution need not show that anyone
was in fact so influenced or coerced.
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himself, unless he expresses it to others or indicates it by his conduct.

71

By requiring prosecutors to demonstrate "a decision of the mind," a "conscious
objective" that is "known only to [the defendant] himself," the statute sets a high
evidentiary hurdle. To be sure, a defendant's "purpose" to commit a crime can be and
often is shown and proven at trial, but the terrorism statute requires something slightly
different. It requires, for example, the additional intent to "influence the policy of any
government by the specified offense." 72 Thus, it is not only the purpose to commit the
offense, but also the overarching aim of the offense that must be demonstrated.
Arguably, far fewer "mere criminals" can be shown to intend not only to influence and
intimidate the immediate victims of their crimes, but a governmental or civilian body as
well-as evidenced by there being only one defendant, Biswanath Halder, charged
under the Ohio statute since its passage in 2001, with the judge ultimately dismissing
those charges before the jury's deliberation. 73 In this respect, Ohio's statutory scheme
may be viewed as narrowly crafted and limited, designed to apply only to the kinds of
crimes and activities that first inspired the legislation: the planes of September 11.
Indeed, it is largely undisputed that the sort of politically or religiously motivated
terrorism of that infamous day would fall squarely within a natural reading of Ohio's
terrorism statute; that is, violent attacks of mass murder aimed at "terrorizing" the

American people and influencing the government's foreign policies would undoubtedly
be covered and anticipated by the language of the Ohio Code. Thus, to the extent that
the Ohio legislature intended to draft anti-terrorism legislation that could be used to
74
concern
attackers-a very real
prosecute future al-Qaeda or Timothy McVeigh-style
75
to have succeeded.
seems
in the months after September 11-the legislature
It is precisely this limited "political purpose" requirement, however, that presents a
subtle but potentially significant break from Ohio's common law understanding of
terrorism's corollary terms: "terror" and "terrorize." To the extent that "terrorism"
might naturally be considered to involve crimes of "terror" that are in turn intended to
precipitate popular or political change, it may be instructive to examine how Ohio
71. State v. Henderson, 1986 Ohio App. LEXIS 6317, *4 (10th App. Apr. 8, 1986).
72. OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 2909.24(A)(2) (LexisNexis 2004).
73. See supra Part I. For a more detailed discussion of Halder's terrorism prosecution and the
application of Ohio's terrorism statute, see Mclntyr, supra note 69. It may be argued that Halder's terrorism
prosecution is evidence of the statute's breadth and vagueness leading to prosecutorial misapplication. A full
analysis of this argument and whether Halder's case falls within the statute's intended scope lies beyond the
bounds of this article, as indicated in the Introduction. That there has been only one terrorism indictment
under the new statute suggests, however, that prosecutors have not so far used the statute to prosecute serial
criminals or the more "common criminals" whose crimes may have induced terror in the surrounding
community, and have limited prosecution to a single case involving a violent school murder and kidnapping
with nearly 100 victims.
74. See United States v. McVeigh, 153 F.3d 1166, 1176 (10th Cir. 1998) (affirming Timothy McVeigh's
death sentence and conviction "on eleven counts stemming from the bombing of the Alfred P. Murrah Federal
Building in Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, that resulted in the deaths of 168 people").
75. See, e.g., Hannah Report, Taft Urges Quick Passage of Anti-Terror Bills (Oct. 30, 2001) (describing
Ohio State Senator Bill Spada's comments on September 11 and the terrorism legislation: "we need to do
everything possible that we can to prevent things from happening and to swiftly and severely punish those
who are perpetrating these acts"); see also Press Release, Governor Robert Taft, Taft Signs Anti-Terrorism
Bill (May 15, 2002), available at http://govemor.ohio.gov/releases/Archive2002/051502sbl84.htm
(discussing Ohio Governor Robert Taft's remarks that Ohio's terrorism statute provides "an important tool for
our law enforcement to prosecute individuals who commit acts of terror").
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jurisprudence has historically understood crimes of "terror." Such an examination may
inform our reading of the broader and less-defined language of Ohio's anti-terrorism
statute, 76 and provide some indication of how the events of September. 11 may have
fundamentally altered our country's notions of terrorism.
IV. "TERRORISM" IN OHIO'S STATUTORY AND COMMON LAW
Ohio has grappled with the semantic difficulties of "terror" before. At least two
state statutes have employed the words "terrorism" and "terrorize" before September
11, and both failed to define the terms, 77 effectively leaving it to the courts to provide a
definition. How Ohio courts have interpreted those statutes may shed light on how
prosecutors and courts should understand and interpret the state's current anti-terrorism
language. 78 This section looks at how Ohio courts have treated terror-related statutory
provisions in the criminal syndicalism and kidnapping contexts, and explores a number
of the other ways in which the courts have understood, used, and in some sense helped
provide a legal framework for defining "terrorism" and "terrorize" contextually.
A. CriminalSyndicalism

In the aftermath of the First World War, Ohio, like many states, drafted criminal
syndicalism statutes 79 "designed to punish those of communistic habits of thought who
prefer force to reason." 80 The state's Criminal Syndicalism Act of 191981 criminalized
spreading the "doctrine [of criminal syndicalism] which advocates crime, sabotagewhich is defined as the malicious injury or destruction of the property of anotherviolence, or unlawful methods of terrorism as a means of accomplishing industrial or
political reform."' 82 The statute referred to "unlawful methods of terrorism" without
any elaboration and then, having so defined criminal syndicalism, the statute declared
83
its mere advocacy to be a felony.
76. Indeed, the Ohio Revised Code provides that to interpret ambiguous statutory language and discern
the legislature's intent, the courts may consider "among other matters: the object sought to be attained; the
circumstances under which the statute was enacted; the legislative history; the common law or former
statutory provisions; the consequences of a particular construction; the administrative construction." OHIO
REv. CODE ANN. § 1.49 (LexisNexis 2004) (emphasis added).
77. See id. § 2905.01 (making "terrorize" an aggravating factor in kidnapping); id. § 13421-23 (repealed)
(making it illegal to engage in "unlawful methods of terrorism").
78. Of course, it may be argued that today's definition or understanding of "terrorism" is only
semantically or tangentially related to the root words "terror" and "terrorize," in which case the Ohio statute
departs significantly from any common law understanding of those terms, and there is little to be gleaned
from their contextual study. If this is the case, however, studying the common law usage of those terms will
reveal such a radical shift in meaning and prompt a search for alternative interpretive theories for
understanding "terrorism" today.
79. Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969) (noting that, "[flrom 1917 to 1920, identical or quite
similar [criminal syndicalism] laws were adopted by 20 states and two territories").
80. Ohio v. Kassay, 184 N.E. 521, 527 (Ohio 1932) (observing in dicta that "[t]he various statutes on
criminal syndicalism have been enacted since the conclusion of the World War. Criminal syndicalism is the
overhang of that conflict").
81. OHIO REV. CODE §§ 13421-23 (LexisNexis 2004), invalidatedby Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444
(1969).
82. Id. § 2923.12, invalidatedby Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969) (emphasis added).
83. Id. §§ 13421-23, invalidated by Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969). The provision read in
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In State v. Kassay,84 the Ohio Supreme Court upheld the statute as a constitutional
exercise of the state's police power to "impose punishment upon those who make
utterances inimical to the public welfare and which have a natural tendency to incite to
crime or to disturb the public peace." 85 Nearly forty years later, the United States
Supreme Court famously struck down the Ohio law on First Amendment grounds in
Brandenburg v. Ohio.86 But by Kassay, in 1932, the U.S. Supreme Court's First
Amendment jurisprudence had proceeded only as far as Whitney v. California,87 and the
Ohio Supreme Court, in part relying on Whitney, 88 affirmed the statute's
constitutionality. In doing so, the Ohio court made several references to the statute's
"unlawful methods of terrorism" language-without itself defining the phrase-in
discussing the state's obligation to protect its citizens from violence. 89 Applying what

Any person who by word of mouth or writing, advocates or teaches the duty, necessity or propriety
of crime, sabotage, violence or unlawful methods of terrorism as a means of accomplishing
industrial or political reform; or prints, publishes, edits, issues or knowingly circulates, sells,
distributes or publicly displays any book, paper, document, or written matter in any form,
containing or advocating, advising or teaching the doctrine that industrial or political reform
should be brought about by crime, sabotage, violence or unlawful methods of terrorism; or openly,
willfully, and deliberately justifies, by word of mouth or writing, the commission or the attempt to
commit crime, sabotage, violence or unlawful methods of terrorism with intent to exemplify,
spread or advocate the propriety of the doctrines of criminal syndicalism; or organizes or helps to
organize or become a member of, or voluntarily assembles with any society, group or assemblage
of persons formed to teach or advocate the doctrines of criminal syndicalism; is guilty of a felony
and punishable by imprisonment in the state penitentiary for not more than ten years, or by a fine
of not more than five thousand dollars, or both.
Id.
84. Ohio v. Kassay, 184 N.E. 521 (Ohio 1932).
85. Id. at 525.
86. 395 U.S. 444, 449 (1969) (ruling that "a statute which, by its own words and as applied, purports to
punish mere advocacy and to forbid, on pain of criminal punishment, assembly with others merely to advocate
the described type of action . . . falls within the condemnation of the First and Fourteenth Amendments.").
Brandenburg involved the prosecution of a member of the Ku Klux Klan. Appellant, Brandenburg, was
charged under Ohio's Criminal Syndicalism Act for his televised statements at a Klan rally. The Supreme
Court reversed Brandenburg's conviction after reciting his speech in full:
This is an organizers' meeting. We have had quite a few members here today which are-we have
hundreds, hundreds of members throughout the State of Ohio. I can quote from a newspaper
clipping from the Columbus, Ohio Dispatch, five weeks ago Sunday morning. The Klan has more
members in the State of Ohio than does any other organization. We're not a revengent [sic]
organization, but if our President, our Congress, our Supreme Court, continues to suppress the
white, Caucasian race, it's possible that there might have to be some revengeance taken.
We're marching on Congress, July the Fourth, four hundred thousand strong. From there we are
dividing into two groups, one group to march on St. Augustine, Florida, the other group to march
into Mississippi. Thank you.
Id. at 446-47. The Court also noted the airing of a second tape that
showed six hooded figures one of whom, later identified as the appellant, repeated a speech very
similar to that recorded on the first film. The reference to the possibility of "revengeance" was
omitted, and one sentence was added: "Personally, I believe the nigger should be returned to
Africa, the Jew returned to Israel." Though some of the figures in the films carried weapons, the
speaker did not.
Id. at 447.
87. 274 U.S. 357 (1927), overruledby Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969).
88. In Kassay, the Ohio Supreme Court supported its position by citing Schaefer v. United States, 251
U.S. 466 (1920) (involving violations of the Espionage Act), Frohwerk v. United States, 249 U.S. 204, 206
(1919), and Gitlow v. People of New York, 268 U.S. 652 (1925). Kassay, 184 N.E. at 526.
89. See Kassay, 184 N.E. at 524.
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amounted to a "rational basis" review 90 the state supreme court noted the state's broad
powers in the area of "public safety and welfare" and ruled that it is one thing to speak
and publish freely, but "the right to advocate and teach the propriety of violence and
terrorism as a means of compelling others to agree with one's sentiments is quite
another." 9 1 Thus, said the court, while the Constitution clearly protects "[t]he right to
advocate industrial and political reforms, and even the overthrow of an existing order by
peaceful argument and persuasion," no such protection exists for those who would
"advocate the use of violence and terrorism. . .."92
Finding "[t]he Legislature [to be] a proper judge of the need and of the propriety of
the remedy, ' 93 the court cited Chief Justice Hughes' opinion in Stromberg v.
California94 in holding that "[t]here is no question but that the State may thus provide
for the punishment of those who indulge in utterances which incite to violence and
crime and threaten the overthrow of organized government by unlawful means. There
' 95
is no constitutional immunity for such conduct abhorrent to our institutions."
Offering its own view of the threat presented by criminal syndicalism and the historical
and then-present justifications for its outlaw, the Ohio Supreme Court rather forcefully
concluded that protecting the free speech rights of "those who advocate and teach the
... propriety of the employment of violence and terrorism in an effort to overturn an
existing political order . . . does violence to the genius of our institutions." 96

In

upholding the criminal syndicalism statute, the court had determined that such statutes
"only seek to prevent the use of force, violence, and terrorism with their concomitant
destruction of life and property as a means of promoting proposed reforms rather than
97
appeal to reason."
The Ohio Supreme Court's discussion of criminal syndicalism in the early 1930s is,
in certain respects, closely analogous to the contemporary debate emerging over
terrorism, and it suggests several things about the court's earlier understanding of and
concern for terrorist activity. As an initial matter, Kassay's description of the
legislative impetus for the rapid spread of criminal syndicalism statutes after the First
World War 98 roughly parallels the quick passage of anti-terrorism laws across the
country immediately following September 11.99 Both sets of laws seem propelled by a
90. Id. at 524-25.
The authority for the enactment of these statutes is found in the exercise of the police power, and a
wide discretion and latitude are permitted the Legislature in determining whether its action is
within the reasonable exercise of that power. This discretion, reasonably exercised, is a legislative
function, and does not become justiciable unless the statute is found to have no reasonable relation
to the public welfare. This is only one of the tests of constitutionality. The other test is whether or
not it violates clearly and beyond a reasonable doubt the express limitations of the Bill of Rights.
Id.
91. Id. at 525.
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. 283 U.S. 359 (1931).
95. Kassay, 184 N.E. at 527 (quoting Stromberg v. California, 283 U.S. 359, 368 (1931)).
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. See, e.g., Hiram E. Chodosh, Symposium. September 11 Terrorist Panel Discussion, 34 CASE W.
RES. J.INT'L. L. 149, 152-53 (2002) (panelist Lewis Katz discussing the Fourth Amendment implications and
new "search and seizure" requirements in combating suspected terrorist threats).
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fear that existing criminal laws were insufficient legal weapons for combating a new,
domestic threat-in the first case, communism, and in the second, terrorism. In both
cases, the laws seem aimed at those most hostile to the American system of law,
economics, and government, and, as the Ohio court suggested, the statutes are
"designed to punish those ... who prefer force to reason. ' 1° ° In 1932, such persons
were believed to be those "of communistic habit"' lot who, in the words of one Ohio
court of appeals, posed an unlawful threat to the republican form of American
government insofar as they "admitted that the purpose of their organization was to bring
about fundamental changes in the political and industrial
systems of the United States,
02
and to that extent admitted in a revolutionary purpose."'
Today, similar fears often focus on the "radical," "fundamentalist," religiously
motivated terrorist cells that have vowed "Holy terror" on the enemies of God and
Islam. 103 Clerics like Omar Abdel Rahman of Brooklyn, for example, "welcome being

I mean, do you realize the threat we face at this time? It is far greater than the so-called
"Communist Menace" that existed from 1945 until 1992. The Communist agents in the United
States, such as they were, were not prepared to sacrifice their lives. They thought, as we thought,
in terms of life. That is not true of the enlistees in the Jihad that we are dealing with now. These
are people who are prepared to give their lives. I do not know if we are going to see more
sophisticated plots such as happened on September 11th, but I am afraid, I am desperately afraid,
that we are going to begin to see random, isolated instances of people who have strapped-on
bombs and just walk into a bus or a shopping mall or a Sbarro's Pizza Place and detonate the
bomb, blowing themselves up and people around them. How do you fight that? I do not know how
you fight that, but obviously we are going to have to [find a] balance.
Id.
100. Kassay, 184 N.E. at 527.
101. Id.
102. Burke v. American Legion of Ohio, 14 Ohio App. 243, 245 (1921). The appellate court went on to
describe the admitted purposes of plaintiff, Lotta Burke:
She denied that the downfall of the government was to be accomplished by violence, and restated
that the form of government to be installed in the United States and Ohio was to be the form
prescribed by the Russian Soviet or Third Internationale, and was to be in favor of, and under the
control of the wage workers, members of said organization, to the exclusion of all other classes of
people in the United States; that the government so to be established was to be a dictatorship,
directed and controlled by the organization at Moscow in Russia; and that the people of the United
States were to be subjects of the world soviet organization, and not citizens of the United States...
The plan proposed for bringing about this change was that members of the plaintiffs
organization, whether they be citizens of Ohio, or the United States, or foreigners, should proceed
from their places of assemblage, whatever that means, to take charge of the government, the
industrial institutions of the country, its food supply, mines and railroads, and, after having so
taken charge, force would be used to prevent the citizens of the United States, including its army,
from interfering with the dictatorship thus established. This means, that the change would be
brought about in the manner stated and not by ballot.
Id. at 245-46.
103. See generally DANIEL BENJAMIN & STEVEN SIMON, THE AGE OF SACRED TERROR (2002). See also
WHITE, supra note 19, at 51:

Hoffman says terrorists motivated by religious imperatives differ from political terrorists in several
ways. "Holy terror" contains a value system that stands in opposition to "secular terror." Hoffman
says secular terrorists operate with the realm of dominant political and cultural framework. They
want to win, to beat the political system that is oppressing them. Their goal may be to destroy
social structure, but they want to put something in its place ....
Holy terrorists, however, are
under no such constraints. They see the world as a battlefield between the forces of light and
darkness . . . . The purpose of their operation is to kill. Pointing to Islamic terrorism as an
example, Hoffman says the purpose of terrorism is to kill the enemies of God or convert them to
Islam.
Id. (summarizing Bruce Hoffman's explanation of religiously inspired terrorism).
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terrorists," because, as he understands it, "[t]he Qur'an makes it among the means to
perform jihad for the sake of Allah, which is to terrorize the enemies of God and our
enemies too." 104 And thus, he believes, "we must be terrorists, and we must terrorize
the enemies of Islam, and frighten them, and disturb them, and shake the earth under
their feet." 10 5 Similarly, prosecutors showed jurors footage of Imam Fawaz Damra, the
spiritual leader of Ohio's largest mosque, declaring that "terrorism and terrorism alone
is the path to liberation."'06 Damra was convicted in 2004 of concealing his ties to
known terrorist organizations on his 1994 immigration application. 107
Not surprisingly, it seems that both criminal syndicalism and today's terrorism are
in some way related to effecting political change. With some, like Rahman, vowing to
rattle the foundations of Western civilization, crimes of sabotage, mass murder, and
violence against the United States have been met with new state and federal laws
designed to prevent and prosecute such crimes, effectively renaming them "terrorism."
Criminal syndicalism statutes were crafted to help stop the spread of communist
dissidents that were known to pursue both violent and non-violent means to
"accomplish[] industrial or political reform." 10 8 Likewise, two parts of Ohio's antiterrorism statute expressly define "terrorism" as the commission of a specified offense
"with purpose to . . . [i]nfluence the policy of any government . . . [or] [a]ffect the
conduct of any government .... ,109
Beyond these notable similarities between anti-terrorism statutes and the criminal
syndicalism laws of the post-World War I era, Ohio's Criminal Syndicalism Act and the
Ohio Supreme Court's analysis in Kassay offer a useful framework for understanding
how "unlawful methods of terrorism" were conceived at common law and, in turn, an
instructive comparison to Ohio's current attempt at a statutory definition of terrorism.
A comparison of the use of "methods of terrorism" in the Criminal Syndicalism Act
with the use of "terrorism" as defined in Ohio's 2001 anti-terrorism statute yields two
distinctions.
First, whereas syndicalism "advocate[s] . . . unlawful methods of terrorism as a
means of accomplishing industrial or political reform,"' 110 Ohio's current definition of
"terrorism" understands such political reform or influence to be an elemental part of
terrorism itself. That is, the former views "terrorism" as a mechanism for bringing
about political or social change, with such a purpose being related but ultimately not
necessary to the crime known by "unlawful methods of terrorism." Conversely, the
latter perceives "political reform" as a virtually inherent and inextricable component of
"terrorism" itself, and without the purpose to influence government policy, the
underlying act is not "terrorism." Thus, if criminal syndicalism regarded "terrorism" as

104. Andrew C. McCarthy, FreeSpeech for Terrorists?,http://www.defenddemocracy.org/in-themedia/
inthe media_show.htm?doc-id=263463 (quoting Rahman's speech of Jan. 16, 1993).

105. Id.
106. See Ohio Imam Arrested for Terrorist Ties, Associated Press, (Nov. 25, 2005), available at
http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,176716,00.html.
107. Id.
108. Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 445 (1969) (quoting OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2923.13
(LexisNexis 1969)).
109. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2909.24 (LexisNexis 2004).
110. Brandenburg,395 U.S. at 445 (quoting OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2923.13 (LexisNexis 1969)).
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a means to an end, the terrorism statutes seem to regard "terrorism" today as both means
and end.

This is belied by Kassay's treatment of the syndicalism act. Nowhere does the
Ohio court discuss or define what the legislature meant by "unlawful methods of
terrorism." Nor does the court appear troubled by the lack of any legislative guidance
on its meaning. Rather, the court blithely accepts that the government must "protect its
people from violence and terrorism," and that "the right to advocate and teach the
propriety of violence and terrorism" lies beyond the gates of First Amendment
protection.Ilt To be sure, the relevant First Amendment concerns occupy the court's
attention, but it nevertheless seems content to allow for a "common meaning" of the
term "terrorism" to guide its understanding of the statute, requiring no legal or technical
definition whatsoever. In almost every instance the Kassay court refers to "terrorism,"
it considers it a means to accomplishing a political or industrial end, just as the
syndicalism statute itself also suggests. 12 Indeed, if the court had viewed the phrase
"unlawful methods of terrorism" 1 13 to require the additional element of a political
purpose, then the statute's next clause---"as a means of accomplishing industrial or
political reform"-would have been a meaningless redundancy. If "methods of
terrorism" were understood, by definition, to also require a political purpose, then there
would be no need for the statute to define criminal syndicalism as engaging in
"terrorism" in order to "accomplish[] industrial or political reform."
This first distinction leads to a second significant difference between today's "acts
of terrorism"' 114 and yesterday's "methods of terrorism." 115 Kassay's treatment of
criminal syndicalism's "unlawful methods of terrorism," adopting as it does a
seemingly common meaning of the phrase, refers to "terrorism" much as it refers to
other kinds of violence and crimes against persons and property. Indeed, "methods of
terrorism" is distinguished from "crime," "sabotage," and "violence" almost as a catchall phrase used merely to expand, not narrow or define, the statute's scope. Of the four
illegal activities comprising "criminal syndicalism," the legislature defined only
sabotage, 116 presumably leaving crime, violence, and terrorism to prosecutorial
discretion and a jury's ability to understand words of common parlance. By
implication, "unlawful methods of terrorism" constituted crimes on par with other
crimes of violence, destruction, and sabotage, not necessitating further definition or
explanation, and allowed the court to observe axiomatically that "[a]ny government
which cannot protect its people from violence and terrorism is a government in name
only."' 117 Thus, whereas contemporary
legislators, and courts are groping to
-,,
• scholars,
,,118
define the metes and bounds of "terronsm,
earlier Ohio legislatures and courts were
unconcerned with providing any legal or technical definition of the term and perhaps
111. State v. Kassay, 184 N.E. 521, 525 (Ohio 1932).
112. See id. at 525-26.
113. One wonders, of course, what might constitute a "lawful method of terrorism" which the statutory
language implicitly suggests exists, but this curious implication will not be explored or speculated upon here.
114. See OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2909.21(A) (LexisNexis 2004) (defining "[aict of terrorism").
115. See Kassay, 184 N.E. at 524 (quoting OHIO REV. CODE §§ 13421-23 (LexisNexis 1932)).
116. See id. at 524. "Sabotage" is defined as "the malicious injury or destruction of the property of
another." Id. (quoting OHIO REV. CODE §§ 13421-23 (LexisNexis 1932)).
117. Id. at 525.
118. See supra Part I.
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understood that its meaning, taken in the context of crime, violence, and sabotage, was
commonly understood. Indeed, as discussed in Section V, the common law usage of
terrorism's derivative words "terror" and "terrorize" may have informed the court's
subsequent treatment of "terrorism" in the criminal syndicalism context.
Before moving to those other common law uses, however, it is worth noting that
both of the just-discussed distinctions between "acts of terrorism" and "unlawful
methods of terrorism" may help to make sense of the less-than-defined "intimidate or
coerce a civilian population" language in Ohio's current anti-terrorism statute. By
leaving "civilian population" entirely undefined in the modem code, this language
broadens the statute considerably and allows prosecutors and courts to decide whether a
defendant's intimidation or coercion of as few as three or four people, for example,
amounts to "intimidating a civilian population." Furthermore, having removed the
"influence governmental policy" requirement, the "civilian population" prong may be
the least consistent with today's trend toward understanding terrorism as primarily
politically or religiously motivated violence. 119
The "civilian population" language, however, may not be inconsistent with
Kassay's understanding of "unlawful methods of terrorism" as a means to an end that
may or may not have a political agenda. Indeed, by including the "intimidate or coerce
a civilian population" language, Ohio's terrorism statute seems to incorporate the earlier
view that one can engage in a "method of terrorism" without seeking political reform or
influence. It suggests that if the prosecution can show that the underlying "specified
offense"--whether sabotage, kidnapping, arson, or murder-was intended to
"intimidate or coerce" the people at-large, then it arguably may be regarded as a
"method of terrorism."
It is in this context, of course, that the line between "crime" and "terrorism" blurs.
After all, some might argue, if terrorism is nothing more than a violent crime that
coerces larger numbers of people (or even relatively small numbers of people that might
nevertheless be considered a "civilian population") then perhaps the additional stigma
and charge of "terrorism" are unnecessary and redundant. Moreover, blurring the line
between violent crime and terrorism, and failing to draw an adequate distinction
between the terms, may make it more difficult to distinguish legally, conceptually, or
even semantically between the events of September 11, for instance, and the terrifying
shootings in Columbine High School. The Columbine slayings lacked any known
political or religious motivation but were nonetheless carried out with the requisite
purpose to intimidate an arguably "civilian population" of students and faculty. 120 In
119. See BRUCE HOFFMAN, INSIDE TERRORISM 40 (1998) (defining terrorism as "the deliberate creation
and exploitation of fear through violence or the threat of violence in the pursuit of political change"); Audrey
Kurth Cronin, Introduction: Meeting and Managingthe Threat, in AT'ACKING TERRORISM: ELEMENTS OF A
GRAND STRATEGY 76-80 (Audrey Kurth Cronin & James M. Ludes eds. 2004); YONAH ALEXANDER,
COMBATING TERRORISM 3-4 (2005) (defining terrorism as "the calculated employment or the threat of
violence by individuals, subnational groups, and state actors to attain political, social, and economic
objectives in the violation of law. These acts are intended to create an overwhelming fear in a target area
larger than the victims attacked or threatened").
120. See, e.g., News Services, Columbine High Shooters HadPlotted to Kill 500 Plus Hijack and Crash a
Plane, Investigators Say Friends ProvidedMaterialto Make Bombs, Police Say, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH,
Apr. 27, 1999, at I (reporting that "[a] diary kept by Eric Harris described his and Klebold's plans for
continuing their murderous rampage through the school's neighborhood ... "); Randy Holtz, Shootings Fuel
Debate Over 'Jock Elitism' at Columbine, Athletes Say Stories Exaggerated; Others Tell of Harrassment,
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fact, the difficulty in drawing this distinction epitomizes good portions of the current
debate over defining "terrorism." ' 12 1 Under Ohio's new statutory definition it would
seem that both the airborne siege on the World Trade Center and the Columbine
massacre would constitute "terrorism"-a legal oddity that might nevertheless be
consistent with Ohio's earlier and common law understanding of the term.
B. Kidnapping

Like all states exercising their police power, Ohio has criminalized kidnapping.
The state's kidnapping statute, Ohio Revised Code section 2905.01, reads in part:
(A) No person, by force, threat, or deception, or ... by any means, shall remove
another from the place where he is found or restrain him of his liberty, for any of the
following purposes:...

(3) To terrorize, or to inflict serious physical harm on the victim or another.

12 2

Nowhere, however, does the code define or explain "[t]o terrorize," an omission
that prompts defendants to challenge and appeal their convictions based upon a
statutorily undefined element of the crime.
In State v. Carter,123 Ohio's Eighth District Court of Appeals rejected the
appellant's contention that "the trial court's failure to define the term 'terrorize' when
instructing the jury on the elements of kidnapping" deprived him of a fair trial because
it "freed the jury to 'speculate' about the legal definition of the word." 124 The court of
125
appeals reasoned that "a jury is presumed to know the meaning of common words."
Thus, the court continued, "(t]he word 'terrorize' is not a legal term. It is, therefore, not

DENVER ROCKY MTN. NEWS, Apr. 27, 1999, at 28A (citing witnesses to the shootings who claimed they
heard Harris and Klebod say "All jocks are dead. All jocks stand up. Any jock wearing a white baseball cap
stand up"); Kevin Vaughan, et al., Harris Told ofAmbition to Blow Up Columbine, Students Say Attacker was
Obsessed with Explosives; Investigators Study Tapes, DENVER ROCKY MTN. NEWS, Apr. 29, 1999, at 4A
(discussing reports that Harris and Kelbold frequently talked of assaults on Columbine High School); Kevin
Vaughan, Another Video Depicts Attack on School, Student Film Produced in 1997 Shows Armed Teens in
Hallways, Ends with Columbine Exploding, DENVER ROCKY MTN.NEWS, May 6, 1999, at 5A (discussing the
video tapes that "act out what amounts to a practice run for the Columbine attack. .. the film shows [Klebold
and Harris] shooting at their friends, who pretend to be jocks"); James Brooke, Writings Prompted Warning
from Columbine Teacher, THE PLAiN DEALER (Cleveland), May 11, 1999, at 5A (discussing the warning signs
prior to the attack).
121. See supra notes 30 and 36.
122. OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 2905.01 (LexisNexis 2004). The other prohibited "purposes" include:
(1) To hold for ransom, or as a shield or hostage; (2) To facilitate the commission of any felony or
flight thereafter; ...(4) To engage in sexual activity, as defined in section 2907.01 of the Revised
Code, with the victim against the victim's will; (5) To hinder, impede, or obstruct a function of
government, or to force any action or concession on the part of governmental authority.
Id.
123. No. 59223, 1991 Ohio App. LEXIS 5500 (Ohio Ct. App. Nov. 14, 1991).
124. Id. at "15.
125. Id. at *16 (relying on Ohio Jury Instructions § 1.80 and noting that the jury instructions define
"terrorize" [Ohio Jury Instructions § 505.01 (A)]).
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error to not define the term, but to allow the jury to give the common meaning to it
pursuant to [Ohio Jury Instructions] 1.80." 126
Refusing to substitute its own legal or technical definition for the jury's "common
meaning" of "terrorize," the appellate court let stand the jury's finding that Anthony
Carter had committed kidnapping with the purpose "to terrorize" his victim as required
by Ohio Revised Code section 2905.01. The following facts underlying that finding are
thus instructive in formulating a "common meaning" of the term "terrorize." Carter
broke into the home of his ex-girlfriend, Pamela Ballad. After she demanded that he
leave, a brief struggle ensued with Carter striking Pamela, pushing her to the couch,
127
brandishing a .25 automatic handgun, and threatening to shoot her in the head.
Carter decided not to shoot and after a second struggle forced Pamela and their daughter
out of the house and into his car.128 Arriving at his mother's house, Carter locked
Pamela in his bedroom where he "held her down by kneeling on her arms," hit her when
she refused intercourse, and then raped her. 129 The jury convicted Anthony Carter of
rape and kidnapping with intent "to terrorize." From this it follows that the jury
understood the "common meaning" of "terrorize" to include the kind of trauma inflicted
on Pamela Ballad.
Ohio's lack of a statutory definition for "terrorize" in its kidnapping statute was
again challenged in State v. Canter.130 In Canter,like Carter,the appellant argued that
"the trial court committed reversible error by excluding an instruction on the essential
element of 'terrorizing." ' 13 1 He urged that "because the dictionary definitions of 'fear'
(which is an element of abduction) and 'terrorize' are indistinguishable, it can be
inferred that the jury used 'fear' interchangeably with 'terrorize' in order to convict him
of kidnapping."' 132 Noting that the 10th Appellate District had "not had the opportunity
to address whether 'terrorize' need be defined,"' 133 the court followed Judge Harper's
opinion in Carterand concluded with him "that, because 'terrorize' was not a term with
special or technical meaning in the law, the jury was presumed to know its meaning...
[and could] apply the common meaning of 'terrorize."' ' 134 The Canter court rejected
appellant's argument "that it could be inferred that the jury defined135'terrorize' and 'fear'
interchangeably," dismissing it as "mere speculation on his part."
Thus, as in Carter, the appeals court in Canter affirmed a jury's application of a
"common meaning" of "terrorize," and upheld a kidnapping-with-a-purpose-to-terrorize
conviction based on the following: Canter approached sixteen-year-old April Schaible
holding a gun and said "he needed a favor and asked her to accompany him." 136 The
victim testified that she was forcibly led into the woods where she was told that Canter

126.
127.
128.
129.
130.
131.
132.
133.
134.
135.
136.

Id.
Id. at *4.
Id.
Id.at*5.
No. 01AP-531, 2002 Ohio App. LEXIS 1363 (Ohio Ct. App. Mar. 26, 2002).
Id. at *5.
Id.

Id.
Id. at *6.
Id. at *7.
Id. at *1.
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"wanted to tape her hands to a tree." When she resisted, he pulled out a gun, pointed it
at her, and tried to tape her to the tree. After two police cruisers drove by37the wooded
area, Canter released Schaible and they walked out of the woods together. 1
It may be logically inferred from the courts' treatment of both Carter and Canter
that the "common meaning" of "to terrorize" may be entrusted to the jury's deliberation.
Those juries, in turn, have found that various combinations of threatening statements,
the brandishing of firearms, and the temporary abduction and restraint of victims at
gunpoint, meet that commonly understood definition and satisfy the statutory element of
"terrorize."
But Ohio courts have not relied on juries alone to divine the common meaning of
"terrorize" in the kidnapping context. In State v. Garduno,138 for example, the
Eleventh District Court of Appeals found no error in the trial court's definition of
"terrorize." 139 The court found no error where "' [t]errorize' was defined as 'to impress
with terror or fear or to intimidate by coercion."' 140 It is not clear from where the trial
court drew its definition, but it was accepted as an entirely reasonable one on appeal.
More recently, and noting both the Carter and Canter decisions to leave the definition
of terrorize to the jury, State v. Leasure looked sua sponte to Merriam Webster's
14 1
Collegiate Dictionary in finding "terrorize" to mean: "to fill with terror or anxiety."'
In Leasure, like the cases discussed above, the court upheld the jury's determination
that the defendant had intended to terrorize the victim, "fmd[ing] that a rational
factfinder could have found the essential elements of kidnapping, particularly the
142
'terrorize another' language, proven beyond a reasonable doubt."'
In the kidnapping context, the Ohio legislature has granted the state judiciary wide
latitude in defining the "terrorize" element of kidnapping, and the courts remain
unwilling to require the legislature to provide any additional guidance on the subject.
Thus, it seems that what satisfies the prosecution's burden of proving a "purpose to
terrorize" is to be decided on an as-applied, case-by-case basis, with the fact finders
assessing the circumstances of each case, and applying anything from a dictionary
definition to their own common understanding of the term.
It is perhaps helpful to understanding Ohio's post-September 11 terrorism
legislation to realize that it is not unprecedented for the legislature to give broad
discretion to the courts and prosecutors in determining what constitutes "terror," or a
"purpose to terrorize." Furthermore, the state's willingness to see "terror" effectively
defined on an as-applied basis, controlled by the facts of the individual cases, and left to
the common understanding of the juries, stands in stark contrast to calls for a simple or
universally accepted and applied definition of "terrorism." Allowing juries to use the
term's "common meaning" appears paradoxical on one level in light of "terrorism's"
multiple and competing definitions and its relative lack of any "commonly" accepted
meaning. On another level, however, assessing "terror" and "terrorize" on a case-by137. Id.
138. No. 710, 1979 Ohio App. LEXIS 12085 (Ohio Ct. App. July 2, 1979).
139. Id. at *10.
140. Id.
141. State v. Leasure, No. L-02-1207, 2003-Ohio-3987, 2003 Ohio App. LEXIS 3548, at **14 (Ohio Ct.
App. July 25, 2003) (quoting MERRIAM WEBSTER'S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 1217 (10th ed. 1996)).
142. Id. at **16.
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case basis implicitly recognizes "the problem of the problem of definition," ' 143 and
leaves these words in the hands of a contemporary jury of peers to determine, as fact
finders, whether specific criminal acts perpetrated against specific individuals or
communities comport with their current notions of terror. In effect, this allows the law
to take stock of the people's evolving conception of terrorism.
V. OTHER USES OF "TERRORISM" AND "TERROR" IN OHIO'S COMMON LAW

At least part of the Ohio legislature's unmodified use of "methods of terrorism" in
defining criminal syndicalism, and the Kassay court's willingness to write of "violence
and terror" in nearly synonymous terms, may have been born of the same deference that
still allows a jury's common understanding of the term "to terrorize" to control a
kidnapping verdict. 144 That is, although the state's criminal code now employs the
terms "terrorize" and "terrorism," they were not, until just recently, legal terms 145 and
"a jury is presumed to know the meaning of common words." 146 This section explores
how and in what contexts the words "terror" and "terrorism" were used by Ohio courts
before and after both Kassay and Ohio's post-September 11 anti-terrorism statute. 147
Though this examination falls far short of exhaustive, looking at these contextual uses
may inform the current debate over how state law should define and prosecute terrorism
in the future.
A. "Terrorism"
Ohio courts referred to "terrorism" as early as 1917. The word seems first to have
appeared in a beautifully written opinion by Judge Martin Ambrose Foran of the
Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas. In Epoch Producing Corporation v.
Davis,148 Judge Foran granted the plaintiffs petition to enjoin Cleveland's mayor,
Harry L. Davis, from preventing the exhibition of "a certain photo-play called 'The
Birth of a Nation."' 149 That play depicted "in vivid moving pictures the scenes of
strife, confusion, and social chaos pertaining to what is known as the reconstruction of
the states that had seceded from the Union." 150 Given the later Kassay and
Brandenburg line of cases involving "terrorism" and the First Amendment, it is
somewhat fitting that "terrorism" debuted on Ohio's legal stage in a case that balanced
government censorship aimed at preserving the public peace against the freedoms of
speech and expression.

143. See Cooper, supra note 15.
144. See State v. Carter, No. 59223, 1991 Ohio App. LEXIS 5500, at *3 (Ohio Ct. App. Nov. 14, 1991).
145. Guy B. Roberts, Self-Help in Combatting State-Sponsored Terrorism: Self Defense and Peacetime
Reprisals, 19 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. 243, 249 (1987) (noting that "terrorism is not a legal term of art").
146. State v. Leasure, 2003 Ohio App. LEXIS 3548, at ** 14.
147. This section will not formally examine the common law appearances of "terrorize" in light of the
prior discussion of"to terrorize" in Section 11and the forthcoming discussion of "terror" in Section IV(2).
148. 19 Ohio N.P. (n.s.) 465 (Ct. C.P. 1917).
149. Id.
150. Id. at 469. Judge Foran objected that "[t]he name of this photo-play is a misnomer. It ought to be
called the 'Phoenix of Liberty Arising from the Ashes of Treason."' Id.
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"The Birth of a Nation" was a false 151 and demonizing parody 152 of southern
reconstruction, a piece of revisionist history in the vein of "The Clansman" 153 and the
"The Fool's Errand"' 154 that served as "an apology for conduct and for [racist] acts that
can not [sic] be commended or condoned." 155 The film was, for all practical purposes,
racist propaganda, and the question before the court was whether "if exhibited, it would
have a tendency to create and would probably result in a serious breach of the peace" in
light of "certain scenes in the play [that] either depict or suggest acts and operations of
certain men organized in a conspiracy, secret or otherwise, against law and order and in
defiance of governmental authority."1 56 Ultimately, "governed by the iron rule of legal
exegesis, and not by any question of sentiment or personal predilection,"' 57 the court
granted the petitioner's request and refused to allow the Mayor of Cleveland to bar the
film's screening, but it was in this context of racial animus that "terrorism" was first
penned by the Ohio judiciary. Writing of the political struggle between the Republican
and Democratic parties over the enfranchisement of the former slaves after the Civil
War, 158 Judge Foran's following observation provides the context of the word's first
common law appearance:
Hence arose a divergence of opinion and a clash of political ideas. And this contest
grew so bitter that I, who was a participant in many of the scenes I witnessed [in the
photo-play] last evening, was frequently of the opinion that the rebellion did not end
at Appomattox. Between the Freedman's Bureau on the one hand, with its horde of
hungry carpet-bagging agents, and the Ku Klux Klan on the other with its slogan of
terrorism, the lot of the colored man was indeed sad and pitiable. 159
That "terrorism" at common law should first describe the Ku Klux Klan creates an

151. Id. at 473-74 ("Turning now to the incidents of this play, it may be said without fear of contradiction
that scenes are depicted which have but very slight foundation in fact, if any at all .... Besides, it is a travesty
on historical fact, or at least a gross and misleading exaggeration.").
152. Id. at 474-75.
The character of Silas Lynch, if it is intended to represent John R. Lynch of Mississippi, is not only
a caricature and a travesty, but a falsification of history .... [But] if it is intended to typify Silas
Lynch as a representative or embodiment of Senator Bruce [of Louisiana], the character is not only
overdrawn, distorted and a travesty, but it is absolutely false and untrue.
Id.
153. "The Clansman" was a "historical romance of the Ku Klux Klan," a play based on the novel of the
same title written in 1905 by Thomas Dixon, Jr.
154. Epoch Producing Corp., 19 Ohio N.P. (n.s.) at 471.
155. Id. at 475.
156. Id. at 466.
157. Id. at 477. Judge Foran's opinion was a clear and forceful condemnation of the film, and he wished
to make equally clear, stating twice, that "[t]he issues involved in this proceeding are to be governed by the
iron rule of legal exegesis, and not by any question of sentiment or expediency." Id. at 466.
158. Id. at 470.
By emancipation the colored person became a whole human being; and this necessarily increased
the representation in Congress of the southern states. The radicals in the North, fearing lest the
South might again become dominant, desired above all things to enfranchise these people. The old
Democratic Party, north and south, believed that, with the accession of this large vote, the
Republican Party would be permanently entrenched in power for perhaps a century to come.
Id.
159. Epoch ProducingCorp., 19 Ohio N.P. (n.s.) at 470 (emphasis added).
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almost
poetic
,, ..
,160 etymology, posturing members of the KKK as Ohio's first ascribed
16 1
Like other instances of "terrorism" in Ohio law and jurisprudence,
"terrorists."
Judge Foran used the term without elaboration, as if taking for granted that his reader
would understand precisely what he meant with no explanation necessary. Of course,
the stated goals and antagonizing tactics of the Klan were not unknown to his readership
in 1917, and the judge went on to write that "the southern historian, William Garrott
Brown, admits that the Ku Klux Klan often resorted to violence, and that negroes as
well as carpet-baggers were whipped and flogged and murdered."' 162 A full discussion
of the Klan as an American terrorist organization lies beyond the scope of this article,
though certain comparisons to our contemporary understanding and statutory definition
of terrorism prove readily apparent.
First, the Klan did "often resort[] to violence," whipping and flogging and
murdering, 163 and those acts would satisfy the "specified acts of violence" component
of Ohio's anti-terrorism statute. 164 Second, the statute's "target" component is
arguably implicated in the recorded Klan statements at issue in Brandenburg calling for
political marches on Congress, Mississippi, and St. Augustine, Florida, suggesting that
the group targeted governmental policy and conduct. 165 Furthermore, the discernible
portions of the Klansman rally transcribed in a Brandenburg footnote suggest that the
Klan also targeted certain "civilian populations," as members were heard saying "[slend
the Jews back to Israel," "[b]ury the niggers," and "[n]igger will have to fight for every
inch he gets from now on,"'166 thereby satisfying the statute's broader "intimidate or
coerce a civilian population" provision. 167 The remaining question is whether the
whippings, floggings, and murders described by William Garrott Brown, or the
infamous cross-burnings and church bombings 168 were intended to intimidate, coerce,
or influence a civilian population, a governmental policy, or both. Here, Mr.
Brandenburg's speech at the "organizers' meeting," where members called for
"constitutional betterment," arguably demonstrates the group's purpose: "We're not a
revengeant [sic] organization, but if our President, our Congress, our Supreme Court,
continues to suppress the white, Caucasian race, it's possible that there might have to be
some revengeance [sic] taken." 169 If prosecutors could show that the Klan's violent
160. Recall that the Supreme Court's decision in Brandenburgto strike down Ohio's criminal syndicalism

statute centered on a Cincinnati media outlet's video tape of a Hamilton County Klan rally. Brandenburg v.
Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969).
161. See supra Parts I,II(A) and II(B).
162. Epoch ProducingCorp., 19 Ohio N.P. (n.s.) at 471.

163. The Shelby County Ohio Historical Society offers a concise and salient history of the Klan and its
terrorism, David Lodge, IT'S HISTORY, Just for Kids . . .Black History, Ku Klux Klan (June 1998),
http://www.shelbycountyhistory.org/schs/blackhistory/kukluxklan.htm.
164. OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 2909.21(E)(1) (LexisNexis 2004) ("'Specified offense' means any of the
following: (1) A felony offense of violence, a violation of section 2909.04 or 2927.24 of the Revised Code, or
a felony of the first degree that is not a violation of any provision in Chapter 2925 or 3719 of the Revised
Code.").
165. Id. § 2909.24(A)(2) ("No person shall commit a specified offense with purpose to do any of the
following: ...(2) Influence the policy of any government by intimidation or coercion.").
166. Brandenburg, 395 U.S. at 446 n.l.
167. Id. § 2909.24(A)(1) ("No person shall commit a specified offense with purpose to do any of the
following: (1)Intimidate or coerce a civilian population.").
168. See supra note 163.
169. Brandenburg,395 U.S. at 446.
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"revengeance" was taken with the purpose to intimidate the people of Mississippi, St.
Augustine, the President, Congress, or the Supreme Court, then such "revengeance"
would constitute terrorism as currently defined by Ohio law. In this respect, Ohio's
post-September 11 statutory understanding of terrorism echoes its earlier common law
recognition of the "revengeant" "slogans of terrorism" executed by the state's Ku Klux
Klan.
More generally, much like the kidnapping and criminal syndicalism statutes and
cases, Judge Foran relied on a common meaning of the term and considered it obvious
that the Ku Klux Klan employed a "slogan of terrorism." The court, in its first usage of
the word, presumed a common meaning and "terrorism" was essentially defined
contextually, its meaning derived from common usage and the well-known violence of
the Klan.
Since its 1917 debut in Epoch Corporation v. Davis, the term "terrorism" has
appeared in less than twenty other Ohio cases, 17 and although several of these
instances do little to advance our contemporary understanding of terrorism, their usage
runs the term's defmitional gamut, from describing the highly political to the merely
criminal acts of Ohio's "terrorists." After Epoch, it next surfaced in Burke v. American
Legion of Ohio,171 a 1921 case from the First Appellate District again involving Ohio's
criminal syndicalism statute. In Burke, the plaintiff alleged that members of the
American Legion had destroyed books and pamphlets belonging to the Cincinnati Local
of the Communist Labor Party of Ohio, and "terrorism" appeared only as it did in the
criminal syndicalism act. 172 The court did not expound on the statutory use or meaning
of "unlawful method of terrorism," other than to describe the plaintiff's admitted "plan
proposed for bringing about this [political] change."' 1 73 It refused to overturn the jury's
determination that the plaintiff had not been damaged, believing that "[s]uch a holding
170. See, e.g., State v. Atalla, 813 N.E.2d 84, 91 (Ohio Ct. App. 2004); State v. Brown, No. 03AP-13D,
2004-Ohio-2990, 2004 Ohio App. LEXIS 2621, at **37 n.9 (Ohio Ct. App. June 10, 2004); State v. Jones,
No. 03AP-696, 2004-Ohio-1624, 2004 Ohio App. LEXIS 1435, at **8 (Ohio Ct. App. Mar. 31, 2004);
Portage County. Bd. of Comm'rs. v. City of Akron, 808 N.E.2d 444, 475 (Ohio Ct. App. 2004); State v.
Vaughn, No. 683, 2003-Ohio-7023, 2003 Ohio App. LEXIS 6400, at *3 (Ohio Ct. App. Dec. 15, 2003); State
v. Tarver, No. 2002CA00394, 2003-Ohio-6840, 2003 Ohio App. LEXIS 6174, at **13 (Ohio Ct. App. Dec.
15, 2003); State ex. rel. Becker v. Ohio State Highway Patrol, No. 02AP-918, 2003-Ohio-1450, 2003 Ohio
App. LEXIS 1383, at **3 (Ohio Ct. App. Mar. 25, 2003); Office of Disciplinary Counsel v. Baumgartner, 796
N.E.2d 495, 503 (Ohio 2003); Local Lodge 1297, Int'l Ass'n of Machinists & Aerospace Workers v. Allen,
490 N.E.2d 865, 878 (Ohio 1986); State v. Young, 406 N.E.2d 499, 507 (Ohio 1980).
171. 14 Ohio App. 243, 1921 WL 1301 (Ohio Ct. App. July 11, 1921).
172. Id. at 244-45. That is, the court summarized the defendant's chief argument as being that its actions
were justified because:
[t]he plaintiff and her associates were engaged in a criminal conspiracy against the constitution and
laws of the United States and of the state of Ohio; that the purpose was to bring about the
subversion and downfall by violence of the Constitution of the United States ... and to substitute
therefore, by revolution and violence, a soviet form of government . . . that plaintiff and her
associates advocated the unlawful method of terrorism as a means of accomplishing their said
industrial and political reform.
Id. (emphasis added).
173. Id. at 246. As the court explained:
The literature destroyed [by the defendants] advocated the seizure of government, the
transportation facilities, the food supply, and the business organizations of the country. And while
the plaintiff disclaimed any intention to use force in the seizure above stated, her counsel admitted
that force would be used to hold possession after it had once been taken.
Id. at 250.
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would in effect be that the court would lend its aid in the destruction of the laws and
constitutions of the United States and of Ohio." 174 Thus, in Burke, "terrorism" falls
closer to the political or revolutionary end of terrorism's definitional continuum. It was
used contextually to describe the conversion and forceful keeping of America by
communist sympathizers.
Despite writing of "unlawful methods of terrorism"
employed as a means toward accomplishing a political end, the Burke court suggests
that the execution of those methods and the desired political revolution were, in fact,
one and the same: "the seizure of government,
the transportation facilities, the food
75
supply, and the organizations of the country." 1
"Terrorism" did not surface again in Ohio jurisprudence until 1932 when it
appeared twice, first in Deutsch v. State 176 and then in Kassay, as already discussed. If
Epoch, Burke, and Kassay represent the more political end of the word's definitional
spectrum, 177 Deutsch v. State begins the courts' recognition that "terrorism" includes a
more typically criminal element as well. At issue in Deutsch was whether "the
language used by the prosecutor in [his] closing argument [at trial] was highly
prejudicial to the rights of plaintiff in error ... .,,178 The court of appeals ruled that the
following language in the soliloquy went too far in prejudicing the jury against the
defendant: "Where is the terrorism in this community except that which defies the law
alone? The underworld
gangs, racketeers. They are the terrorism to people of the
17 9
communities."
Ruling that the closing argument had crossed the line, Deutsch merely conveys an
understanding by the prosecutor that is not explicitly disputed by the court, namely, that
the "underworld gangs" perpetrate a kind of terrorism against the community. Almost
five decades later, Justice Locher expressed a similar sentiment in his dissent from State
v. Young. 180 In Young, the Ohio Supreme Court struck down on vagueness grounds the
state's anti-crime syndicate statute, R.C. 2923.04. 181 Without defining the term any

174. Id. at 250 (citing Lord v. Chadbourne, 42 Me. 429, 440 (1856)).
175. Id. at 250.
176. 188 N.E. 399 (Ohio Ct. App. 1932).
177. See also State v. Raley, 136 N.E.2d 295 (Ohio Ct. App. 1954). Raley involved contempt charges
against defendants who refused to testify before the Ohio Un-American Activities Commission. The case
does not advance our understanding of "terrorism" beyond the idea that terrorism is a "means of effecting
political or economic change." The court, without elaboration, noted that "the Smith Act of Congress, making
sedition a crime, and the Ohio statute making syndicalism, that is, advocacy of force, violence and terrorism
as a means of effecting political or economic change, a crime, were in force." Id. at 308.
178. Deutsch, 188 N.E. at 400.
179. Id.
180. 406 N.E.2d 499 (Ohio 1980).
181. The court reasoned:
The vague language of the statute, which subjects an individual to criminal sanctions for activities,
the legality of which cannot be determined solely by the conduct itself but must be determined by
factors which a person may be unaware of at the time of the conduct, violates due process. [It]
lacks the ascertainable standards of guilt that "give a person of ordinary intelligence fair notice that
his contemplated conduct is forbidden."
Id. at 504.
In particular, the court found the statute far-reaching due to the definition of 'criminal syndicate'..
. A criminal syndicate is defined as 'five or more persons collaborating to promote or engage in':
(1) extortion or coercion; (2) prostitution; (3) theft; (4) gambling; (5) illegal traffic in drugs, liquor,
or firearms; (6) usury; or (7) any offense for the purpose of gain.
Id. The court considered the last two elements of the definition too broad to pass constitutional muster.
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further, Justice Locher, like the Deutsch prosecutor, saw the underworld engaged in
"terrorism" against the community and viewed the crime syndicate statute as a
necessary weapon "to effectively combat at the abhorrent escalation of organized crime,
which is often accompanied 82by acts of terrorism or illegal use of group pressure in order
to achieve unlawful ends." 1
Neither Deutsch nor Justice Locher's dissent requires "terrorism" to sustain a
political motive or to seek political influence. Rather, terrorism, in this context, consists
of organized criminal acts carried out against communities in pursuit of "unlawful
ends." Indeed, in 1986, the Ohio Supreme Court's Justice Holmes used "acts of
terrorism" to describe union officers intimidating several "scabs." ' 183 Their "terrorist"
tactics evidenced at trial included "utterly vicious" threats of bodily harm, cursing and
screaming, followed by union officers running their cars onto the sidewalk, tireslashings, window-smashings, and other violent property damage.184 To be sure, the
striking union officers arguably had a political or industrial motive-preventing socalled "scabs" from crossing the picket line in order to maintain bargaining power in
their labor negotiation-but Justice Holmes' description focused on the nature of the
acts themselves, not their underlying motivation, and he considered these violent threats
as nothing short of "terrorism," "[f]ar from an exercise of First Amendment
rights. . ... 185 Thus, to Justice Holmes, terrorism can be waged against as few as a
handful of picket-breakers and comprises behavior not unheard of in overheated labor
disputes.
Likewise, State v. Keith 186 and State v. Douglas187 suggest that "terrorism" holds a
more mundane criminal meaning and may target a very small number of victims. Keith
found that the defendant's string of seven crimes, including stalking, personal
entreaties, and arsons "illustrat[ed] defendant's modus operandi or pattern of terrorism
to achieve his ends."' 188 In Keith there was a single victim, and in Douglas the court
used terrorism in quotes to describe a one-day series of shootings and felonious assaults
that resulted in two murders. The Douglas court ruled that "evidence that appellant was
involved with certain members of a group in a whole series of acts of 'terrorism' on
January 31, 1991 was highly relevant to the state's case." 189
Notably, in all of these cases the courts use "terrorism" descriptively and find it

182. Id. at 507 (Locher, J., dissenting).
183. See Local Lodge 1297 v. Allen, 490 N.E.2d 865, 867 (Ohio 1986) (noting that "[t]he threshold issue
is whether use of the epithet 'scab' may underpin a state tort action").
184. Id. at 877 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
185. Id. at 878.
186. No. 69267, 1997 Ohio App. LEXIS 914 (Ohio Ct. App. Mar. 13, 1997).
187. No. 63794, 1993 Ohio App. LEXIS 4695 (Ohio Ct. App. Sept. 30, 1993).
188. Keith, 1997 Ohio App. LEXIS 914, at *20. The court explained the facts as follows:
The case below involved a string of seven crimes impacting Ms. Baker and innocent third parties
close to her over an eight month period in 1992. The stalking by driving up and down Jamie
Baker's street, the tracking her down when she moved, the repeated contacts to resume the
relationship, the leaflets, the brick incident, and finally the arsons and theft represented a measured
and escalating modus operandi, whereby defendant sought to isolate Ms. Baker from her friends
and compel her to return to him. The identity of the perpetrator of this string of crimes was the key
issue in this case. The defendant at trial denied any involvement in the crimes.
Id. at *18.
189. Douglas, 1993 Ohio App. LEXIS 4695, at *13.
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unnecessary to explain its meaning beyond the context of the criminal events described.
This is consistent with the bench's willingness to afford the corollaries, "terror" and
"terrorize," their "common meaning" and not to treat them as legal terms of art
requiring legal or technical definitions.
Despite having under twenty explicit
references-an admittedly small sample pool-it is clear at the very least that
"terrorism" has modified a wide range of criminal activity, from the politically and
racially charged .crimes of the Ku Klux Klan and its "slogans of terrorism," to the
notorious violence of the organized crime syndicates, to the modus operandi of a single
victim's stalker.
If these historical uses and understandings of terrorism guide our modem usage and
interpretation of Ohio's anti-terror statute at all, they suggest that the statute's broad
scope, including a purpose to influence both governments and civilians, may not be far
removed from our historical and legal perspectives of terrorism. Indeed, recognition of
the word's broad and non-legal meaning seems to run through both its common law and
statutory use and should not be ignored when interpreting the more nebulous
components of Ohio's criminal terrorism statute.
B. "Terror"
There is a natural, semantic connection between "terror," "terrorize," and their
derivative-"terrorism." Dr. Trench's own "big dictionary," for instance, defines
terrorism as "a system of terror," "a policy intended to strike with terror those against
190
whom it is adopted," and "the fact of terrorizing or condition of being terrorized."
Certainly, since September 11 and even before, a host of popular book titles 19 1 and
newspaper headlines reflect the synonymous relationship between "terror" and
"terrorism," to the point of near inter-changeability. 192 Thus, it may tell only half the
190. OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 820 (2nd ed. 1989). Of course, the United States Supreme Court
addressed the relative value of dictionaries for determining the meaning of words at law in Nix v. Hedden. In
a short case humorously concerned with "[tihe single question . . . whether tomatoes, considered as
provisions, are to be classed as 'vegetables' or as 'fruit,"' the Court observed:
There being no evidence that the words "fruit" and "vegetables" have acquired any special
meaning in trade or commerce, they must receive their ordinary meaning. Of that meaning the
court is bound to take judicial notice, as it does in regard to all words in our own tongue; and upon
such a question dictionaries are admitted, not as evidence, but only as aids to the memory and
understanding of the court.
Nix v. Hedden, 149 U.S. 304, 306-7 (1893).
191. See, e.g., DANIEL BENJAMIN & STEVEN SIMON, THE AGE OF SACRED TERROR (2002); PAUL
BERMAN, TERROR AND LIBERALISM (2003); MARK JUERGENSMEYER, TERROR IN THE MIND OF GOD: THE
GLOBAL RISE OF RELIGIOUS VIOLENCE (University of California Press 2000); JESSICA STERN, TERROR IN THE
NAME OF GOD: WHY RELIGIOUS MILITANTS KILL (2003).

192. A LexisNexis search for "terror" in The New York Times' headlines since September 11,2001 yields
nearly 2000 results. See, e.g., Eric Lichtblau, U.S. Seeks Access to Bank Records to Deter Terror, N.Y.
TIMES, Apr. 10, 2005, at 1;Alexandra Walsh, World Briefing Europe: Germany: Tunisian Acquitted of
Terror Charges, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 7, 2005, at 8; Eric Lipton, U.S. Lists Possible Terror Attacks and Likely
Toll, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 16, 2005, at 1; Reuters, National Briefing: Southwest: Texas: U.S. Deports Former
TerrorSuspect, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 9, 2005, at 19; Editorial, TerrorSuspects' Right to BearArms, N.Y. TIMES,
Mar. 9, 2005, at 24. See also Caryle Murphy & Khalid Saffar, Terror Suspects Grilled, Mocked on Hit Iraqi
TV Show, WASH. POST, Apr. 5, 2005, at Al8; Jerry Markon, Views of Va. Muslim Leader Differs as Terror
Trial Opens, WASH. POST, Apr. 5, 2005, at B04; Patrick McGreevy & Jeffrey L. Rabin, Villaraigosa Outlines
Plans to Fight Terror, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 1, 2005, at 3; Jerry Markon, N. Va. Terror Defendant's Doctor to
Look for Signs of Torture, WASH. POST, Mar. 31, 2005, at A04; Jerry Markon, High Court Declines to Hear
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story to forego any examination of "terror" in the common law, since its usage there
might augment the meaning of "terrorism" and inform today's statutory scheme
designed to prosecute it.
A cursory glance through Ohio's cases, however, reveals not only that state courts
have penned "terror" and "terrorize" far more frequently than "terrorism," but also that
"terror" at common law overwhelmingly refers to "fear," "fright," and heightened
conditions of emotional duress 193 rather than any explicit reference to its more
complicated cousin, terrorism. 194 Indeed, recall counsel's argument on appeal in State
v. Canter that "because the dictionary definitions of 'fear' (which is an element of
abduction) and 'terrorize' are indistinguishable, it can be inferred that the jury used
'fear' interchangeably with 'terrorize' in order to convict him of kidnapping." 19 5 One
may be tempted to conclude, then, that a common law study of "terror" adds little to a
discussion of today's anti-terrorism statute. After all, if "terror" may refer either to
"fear" or to "terrorism" but is almost exclusively used to describe the former, 196 then
examining that usage in order to better understand the latter may be misguided. But this
suggests a schism between "fear" and "terrorism," and it ignores the implicit and close
connection between terror's two meanings: "terror" as an induced fear; and "terror" as
a mechanism for achieving political or civilian influence.
On the contrary, Ohio's common law makes plain that "terror"--even used as a
form of fear-is tightly linked to coercion and behavioral influence. For example, some

Terror Case; WASH. POST, Mar. 22, 2005, at A03.
193. See State v. Perdue, No. 00CA244, 2003 Ohio App. LEXIS 3959, *15 (Ohio Ct. App. Aug. 21, 2003)
(noting that the State argued that a "sudden passion is an emotion such as terror which would render the mind
incapable of reflection. It then defines terror as, among other things, fear caused by the apprehension of
danger").
194. See, e.g., Yeager v. Local Union 20, 453 N.E.2d 666, 670, 672 (Ohio 1983) ("fright and terror," and
"fear and terror"); Baker v. Shymkiv, 451 N.E. 2d 811, 815 (Ohio 1983) (Holmes, J., concurring) ("in fear
and terror"); Bartow v. Smith, 79 N.E.2d 735, 740 (N.Y. App. Div. 1948) ("in fear and terror"); Cincinnati
Northern Traction v. Rosnagle, 95 N.E. 884, 886 (Ohio 1911) ("fright and terror"); Miller v. Baltimore &
O.S.W.R. Co., 85 N.E. 499, 502 (Ohio 1908) ("fright, terror, alarm, anxiety, or distress"); Seaford v. Norfolk
S. Ry. Co. 824 N.E.2d 94, 112 (Ohio Ct. App. 2004) ("dread," "alarm," "fright," "terror," and "panic"); Maag
v. Maag, No. 16-01-162002 Ohio App. LEXIS 1409, at *6 (Ohio Ct. App. Mar. 28, 2002) ("placed in
'absolute * * * terror' and she was 'scared to death'); Phillips v. Mufleh, 642 N.E.2d 411, 415 (Ohio Ct.
App. 1994) ("fright and terror"); State v. Gudger, No. 90 AP-137, 1990 Ohio App. LEXIS 5526, at *6 (Ohio
Ct. App. 1990) ("induces in the victim terror or fear of bodily harm").
195. State v. Catner, No. AP-531, 2002 WL 452461, at *2 (Ohio Ct. App. Mar. 26, 2002).
196. Appearing in over two hundred Ohio opinions, "terror" as an extreme fear has been colorfully
modified. See, e.g., State v. Whitley, No. 84129, 2004 Ohio App. LEXIS 6055, at *32 (Ohio Ct. App. Dec. 9,
2004) ("pure terror"); State v. Trakas, No. 93CA005621, 1994 Ohio App. LEXIS 833, at *4 (Ohio Ct. App.
Feb. 23, 1994) ("sheer terror"); State v. Garner, 56 N.E.2d 623, 640 (Ohio 1995) ("abject terror" in the
context of sexual abuse); Case v. Norfolk & W.R. Co., 570 N.E.2d 1132, 1137 (6th App. Sept. 16, 1988)
("preimpact terror"); State ex rel. Kroger Co. v. Industrial Comm'n, 687 N.E.2d 623, 640 (Ohio 1995) ("terror
of small spaces"); State v. Standberry, No. 69079, 1996 Ohio App. LEXIS 566, at *3-4 (Ohio Ct. App. Feb.
15, 1996) (noting the "state of terror" as defendant drove his ex-wife around aimlessly and then beat her and
threatened her with a box cutter); State v. Griffin, 753 N.E.2d 967, 976 (Ohio Ct. App. 2001) (1st App. Mar.
30, 2001) (describing the "terror of the trailer park").
There are also a number of references to the sleeping disorder commonly known as "night terrors."
See, e.g., Nigro v. Nigro, No. 04CA008461, 2004 Ohio App. LEXIS 5709 (Ohio Ct. App. Nov. 24, 2004);
State v. Sanders, No. 83732, 2004 Ohio App. LEXIS 2151, at *3 (Ohio Ct. App. May 13, 2004); State v.
Krzywkowski, No. 80392, 2002 Ohio App. LEXIS 4586, at *35 (Ohio Ct. App. Aug. 29, 2002); In re Fry, No.
9-12-14, 09-02-15, 9-02-16, 2002 Ohio App. LEXIS 4063, at *19 (Ohio Ct. App. Aug. 2, 2002); State v. Neal,
No. 82 CA 82, 1984 Ohio App. LEXIS 8876, at *18 (Ohio Ct. App. Jan. 20, 1984).
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of the earliest appearances of "terror" described the "terror of arrest" 197 and haled the
threat of punishment as "a terror to offenders" 198-referring to the law's deterrent
power to shape social human action. Moreover, the courts have recognized that
criminals perpetrate terror against their victims in order to intimidate and thereby
influence the victim's behavior. The Ohio Supreme Court most explicitly drew this
connection in State v. Davis, noting:
The use or threat of immediate use of force element of the offense of robbery, as
expressed in [the statute] is satisfied if the fear of the alleged victim was of such a
nature as in reason and common experience is likely to induce a person to part with
property against his will and temporarily suspend his power to exercise his will by
virtue of the influence of the terror impressed. 199
Several appellate decisions illustrate this confluence as well, characterizing
particularly egregious intimidation and violent coercion as nothing less than a "reign of
terror." 200 In State v. Rock, the court described a four-year "reign of terror" 20 1 within a
home that went "way beyond the mere establishment of a parent/child dominance as
argued by appellant." 20 2 The court reported that the child "testified to numerous
occasions when appellant hit [them], threatened to shoot and kill everyone and waved a
gun around the house." 20 3 These incidents were contemporaneous with sexual touching
and threats "to kill them and let their mother watch .......204 Similarly, in State v.
McHenry, the panel cited "overwhelming evidence of kidnapping for sexual conduct,
rape, and gross sexual imposition" and concluded that the "[a]ppellant created a reign of
terror in the household" and abused his position of trust in order "to control their
5
, 20

mother."

Outside of the home and child abuse context, the Second District Court of Appeals

197. Anderson v. Soward, 40 Ohio St. 325, 337 (1883).
198. Railway Co. v. Hutchins, 32 Ohio St. 571, 582 (1877).
199. State v. Davis, 451 N.E.2d 772, 773 (Ohio 1983).
200. See State v. McHenry, No. 2001CA00062, 2001 Ohio App. LEXIS 4763, at *17 (Ct. App. Oct. 15,
2001); State v. Rock, No. 96-CA-30, 1997 Ohio App. LEXIS 3318, at *6 (Ct. App. June 30, 1997); State v.
Kiefer, No. 93-P-0005, 1993 Ohio App. LEXIS 5913, at *12 (Ct. App. Dec. 10, 1993); State v. Herring, No.
13128, 1993 Ohio App. LEXIS 179, at *2 (Ct. App. Jan. 21, 1993); State v. Taylor, No. CA89-04-0641990
Ohio App. LEXIS 681, at *12 (Ct. App. Feb. 26, 1990)(Jones, P.J., dissenting); Smith v. Clark, No. S-86-67,
1988 Ohio App. LEXIS 1521, at *2 (Ct. App. Apr. 29, 1988); State v. Lewingdon, No. C-8302141984 Ohio
App. LEXIS 8826, at *8 (Ct. App. Jan. 25, 1984); Lutes v. State, 174 N.E. 745, 747 (Ohio Ct. App. 1930).
201. It is worth noting here as Bradley Larschan recounted:
The first usage of the term 'terrorism' appears to have been in response to the systematic policy of
violence, intimidation and the use of the guillotine by the Jacobin and Thermidorian movements in
revolutionary France. It has been observed that 'terrorism,' 'terrorist,' and 'terrorize' stem from
the French words 'terrorisme,' 'terroriste,' and 'terroriser,' which developed during the French
Revolution.
Bradley Larschan, Legal Aspects to the Controlof TransnationalTerrorism: An Overview, 13 Ohio N.U. L.
Rev 117, 123 (1986). Thus, Larschan adds, "The Reign of Terror during the French Revolution and the
Revolutionary Catechism of the Russian anarchists Bakunin and Nechaev mark important steps in the
development of modem transnational terrorism." Id.
202. Rock, 1997 Ohio App. LEXIS 3318, at *6.
203. Id. at *5-6.
204. Id. at *6.
205. McHenry, 2001 Ohio App. LEXIS 4763, at *9, *17.
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reiterated in State v. Herring what the trial court "aptly described as a reign of
terror."' 20 6 Extending over a period of two weeks, the reign included "three... armed
and violent entrances into three private homes, followed by brutal, bloody, vicious and
revengeful acts, during which .. .many victims were then beaten, crippled, shot,
stripped of their clothing, tortured, threatened with death and otherwise terrorized and
20 7
injured by the armed gang."
Additionally, a number of Ohio's firearms cases at the turn of the twentieth century
also suggest that "terror," as a kind of debilitating fear with a coercive influence, may
be perpetrated against civilian bodies and the people at-large. In 1904, Martin Walter
was convicted by a justice of the peace for "having in the open air, for the purpose of
shooting, implements for shooting, to wit, one shotgun and cartridges. ... .208 On
appeal, the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas took up the defendant's
constitutional claims and observed that "[t]he offense of going armed with unusual or
dangerous weapons, to the terror of the people, has always been indictable ...at
209
common law."
Whereas Mr. Walter's arrest concerned an "open air" firearms incident, the state's
supreme court applied this same common law principle to the concealed carrying of
arms. In State v. Hogan,2 1 the court saw "no real difficulty" with the constitutionality
of Ohio's law that "forbids the tramp to bear arms."' 2 11 Addressing the proscription in
dicta, the court surmised that although the Second Amendment to the Constitution of
the United States of America 212 ,guarantee[s] to the people in support of just
government such right [to bear arms] and to afford the citizen means for defense of self
and property," the bill of rights does not vindicate a person who "employ[s] those arms
...to the annoyance and terror and danger of its citizens ....213 Moreover, the court
explained, the Second Amendment promise was not "a warrant for vicious persons to
carry weapons with which to terrorize others," 2 14 and, as the court reminded, "[g]oing
armed with unusual and dangerous weapons to the terror of the people is an offense at
common law."215 Thus, a man may not "go ' about
with that or any other dangerous
216
weapon to terrify and alarm a peaceful people."
Hogan has since been followed and cited for the proposition that the public
carrying of firearms may be state-regulated on grounds that it may incite public panic,
fear, and terror in the people. 217 This suggests that the common law has recognized a

206. State v. Herring, No. 13128, 1993 Ohio App. LEXIS 179, at *2 (Ct. App. Jan. 21, 1993)
207. Id. ("The casualties included one death, several shot (one with multiple gunshot wounds), broken
bones, sexual orgy and other traumatic personal injuries inflicted on persons in private homes.").
208. Walter v. State, 3 Ohio N.P. (n.s.) 13, 13 (Ct. C.P. 1905).
209. Id. (quoting 5 Am. & Eng. Enc. Law (2d ed.) 729).
210. State v. Hogan, 63 Ohio St. 202, 218 (Ohio 1900).
211. Id.
212. U.S. CONST. amend. II ("A well regulated Militia, being necessary to the security of a free State, the
right of the people to keep and bear Arms, shall not be infringed.").
213. Hogan, 63 Ohio St. at 218-19.
214. Id. at 219.
215. Id.
216. Id.
217. See Klein v. Leis, 795 N.E.2d 633, 637 (Ohio 2003); Porello v. State, 168 N.E. 135, 138 (Ohio
1929); State v. Nieto, 130 N.E. 663, 664 (Ohio 1920).
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"public terror," one affecting "a peaceful people," or, perhaps in the legislature's more
' 2 18
recent parlance, the "civilian population."
These cases should inform any modem discussion of terrorism and Ohio's antiterrorism statutes in particular. Taken together they demonstrate that courts have
viewed crimes as disparate as theft, child abuse, and firearms possession to be crimes of
"terror." Likewise, seeing "terror" at common law so closely aligned with fear,
apprehension, and attempts to intimidate a "peaceful people," helps to make sense of
recent legislative efforts like Ohio's that have enacted statutes targeting such purposeful
intimidation and called it "terrorism." Insofar as terrorism is conceptually understood
and statutorily defined as a crime committed with intent to influence populations and
policies, its meaning proves remarkably consistent with its semantic common law
relative, "terror."
VI. CONCLUSION

Several important lessons can be drawn from a study of Ohio's earlier statutory and
common law treatment of "terror" and "terrorism." First, prior to the legislature's 2001
definition of "acts of terror" the state was content to leave the statutory meanings of
"terror," "terrorize," and even "terrorism" in the hands of the jury. This deference
provided for an as-applied discovery of terror's "common meaning" that tracked the
gradual evolution of the term in the public square and suggests that such conceptions
were neither static nor engraved in law. Second, the common law reflects the admitted
lack of a uniform definition of "terrorism," and displays the full spectrum of the word's
meaning, from the violent but all-too-common crimes of kidnapping and child abuse, to
the orchestrated efforts of the Ku Klux Klan and communist saboteurs who use violence
in pursuit of political or social goals. Finally, the common law seems not to require a
political or ideological purpose to lie behind every "reign of terror." Instead, Ohio
courts understood that "terror"-in virtually all of its manifest meanings-could be, and
most often was, waged against individuals, communities, or the people at-large for any
number of invidious reasons but was always intended to intimidate, influence, and
control.
The difficulty with imposing these common law perspectives of "terror" upon the
current struggle to define "terrorism" legally, however, may lie in the nation's
perception of terrorism in a post-9/11 world. That is, after September 11, "terrorism"
and its semantic corollaries may in fact carry a kind of social stigma, a connotation that
219
whatever the underlying crime may have been, it has risen well above "mere crime."
The sheer magnitude of the 2001 attacks, the international and military nature of the
218. OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 2909.24(A)(1) (LexisNexis 2005). Similar arguments have proceeded in
the context of free speech. See State v. Loless, 507 N.E.2d 1140, 1142 (Ohio Ct. App. 1986) observing that:
The right of free speech is not without limits .... While the right of free speech entitles citizens to
express their ideas, beliefs, and emotions, regardless of their popularity, it does not extend to the
threatening of terror, inciting of riots, or verbalizing of false information that induces panic in a
public place.
Id.
219. See Cooper, supra note 15, at 106 (observing that "[t]he term 'terrorism' is a judgmental one in that it
not only encompasses some event produced by human behavior but seeks to assign or ascribe a value or
quality to that behavior...").
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"War on Terror," and the severity of the crimes at issue in Virginia's terror prosecutions
of the "Beltway Snipers," John Allen Muhammad and John Lee Malvo, 22 0 may
strengthen the public's desire for the law to distinguish between "mere crime" and true
"terrorism."
If anti-terror laws, such as Ohio's, define and criminalize terrorism per se,
enhancing the penalties for the underlying offense based entirely on the aggressor's
purpose (intimidation) and nature of his victims (government or civilian population),
those definitions must be flexible enough to accommodate unforeseeable cases and
circumstances, but not so broad as to effectively turn every intimidating crime of
violence into a terrorism trial-for at that point "terrorism" has lost its meaning and
legal gravitas. In crafting its terrorism statute, the Ohio legislature attempted to walk
this fine line.
Yet here critics may disparage the state's effort most severely and argue that the
provision that allows criminal "terrorism" to include specified underlying offenses
intended to "intimidate or coerce a civilian population ' 22 1 all but divests "terrorism" of
any significant meaning. Terrorism theorists like Bruce Hoffman, 222 Audrey Kurth
Cronin, 22 3 and Raphael Perl, 22 4 who contend that "terrorism," as defined, must
recognize the political motivations and targets of the crime, presumably would object to
Ohio's looser statutory language that theoretically allows for any number of "common
criminals" to be prosecuted as terrorists. The law's apparent inability to distinguish, for
example, between a man brandishing a pistol in order to incite panic and intimidate a
"peaceful people," and a man who detonates explosives in a crowded football stadium
for the purpose of affecting the Administration's foreign policy, suggests that the two
crimes are in some measure legal equals. It may be objected that trying both men as
220. See Josh White and Tom Jackman, Sentences Not End of Sniper Cases; No Consensus on 2da Trials,
WASH. POST, Mar. 7, 2004, at CO1 (reporting that John Allen Muhammad and John Lee Malvo, "charged with
10 slayings in the Washington region," were "sentenced in separate Virginia courtrooms for committing
terrorism and murder"). See also Carol Morello, Victims' Relatives Still Ask "Why? "; Snipers' Motives
Remain Unresolved, WASH. POST, Mar. 11, 2004, at All (reporting on the "Beltway Snipers" prosecuted
under Virginia's anti-terrorism law). The Washington Post reported:
Yet one question lingers, as unanswerable today as it was Oct. 24, 2002, the day Muhammad
and Malvo were arrested at a Maryland rest area and the killing stopped:
Why did they do it?
Prosecutors were not short of possible motives.
In Muhammad's trial, they suggested that the sniper attacks were an attempt to create a cover so
that Muhammad could kill his ex-wife and get his children back. At his sentencing hearing,
Muhammad tried to throw cold water on that theory, saying that his life had been "wonderful" and
that nothing in particular had frustrated or angered him.
Prosecutors in Malvo's trial brought psychiatrists to the stand who said Malvo told them the
snipers tried to extort $10 million from the government in order to start a multiracial utopia in the
woods of Canada. Not many found that explanation convincing, however.
Id.
221. OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 2909.24(A)(1) (LexisNexis 2005).
222. BRUCE HOFFMAN, INSIDE TERRORISM 14 (1998) (arguing that terrorism is an inherently political act).
223. Audrey Kurth Cronin, Introduction: Meeting and Managingthe Threat, in ATTACKING TERRORISM:
ELEMENTS OF A GRAND STRATEGY 4 (Audrey Kurth Cronin and James M. Ludes eds., 2004) (arguing that
terrorism is "[t]he surprise threat or use of seemingly random violence against innocents for political ends by
a nonstate actor") (emphasis added).
224. Raphael Perl, FOREIGN AFFAIRS, DEFENSE AND TRADE DIVISION, ISSUE BRIEF FOR CONGRESS:

TERRORISM, THE FUTURE AND US. FOREIGN POLICY (2003), http://www.fas.org/irp/crs/IB95112.pdf (arguing
that terrorism does not consist of violence for monetary gain).
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"terrorists" threatens to weaken the law and confound the public's contemporary notion
of terrorism. The relative ambiguity in Ohio's "civilian population" languagedivorced from any political motivation or aim-arguably runs just such a risk. Thus,
the question remains whether much can be gained from the common law's earlier
suggestion that common criminals and child abusers can preside over "reigns of terror,"
that aggravated kidnapping "terrorizes" its victim, and that the Ku Klux Klan and
political dissidents can engage in "methods" and "slogans of terrorism."
These difficulties notwithstanding, the common law perspective proves particularly
instructive for interpreting precisely this more ambiguous component of Ohio's
terrorism law. The statutory recognition that violent crimes perpetrated with intent to
"intimidate or coerce a civilian population"' 225 finds support in the state's case law
history. Furthermore, the law's grant of wide prosecutorial latitude in bringing
terrorism charges against the most violent defendants also comports with a
distinguished common law tradition of allowing prosecutors, judges, and juries to
sketch the contours of criminal "terror." Indeed, it is this very discretion that will
ultimately reflect and accommodate the country's evolving post-September 11 notions
of terrorism and allow the law to arrive at a "common meaning" for a politically
charged word that has otherwise proven impossible to define. Once the inherent
difficulties in framing a unified legal definition of terrorism are acknowledged, however
the nation and its policymakers may come to conceive of terrorism in the 21st century,
the common law stands to serve as a valuable interpretive tool, and taking inventory of
its considerable history with "terror" only informs and advances the law's current
efforts to understand and combat criminal terrorism.

225. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2909.24(A)(1) (LexisNexis 2005).

